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PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND
PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE COVID-19 CRISIS
Tiffany C. Li*
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused millions of deaths and disastrous consequences
around the world, with lasting repercussions for every field of law, including privacy and
technology. The unique characteristics of this pandemic have precipitated an increase in use of
new technologies, including remote communications platforms, healthcare robots, and medical
AI. Public and private actors are using new technologies, like heat sensing, and technologicallyinfluenced programs, like contact tracing, alike in response, leading to a rise in government and
corporate surveillance in sectors like healthcare, employment, education, and commerce.
Advocates have raised the alarm for privacy and civil liberties violations, but the emergency
nature of the pandemic has drowned out many concerns.
This Article is the first comprehensive account of privacy impacts related to technology
and public health responses to the COVID-19 crisis. Many have written on the general need
for better health privacy protections, education privacy protections, consumer privacy protections,
and protections against government and corporate surveillance. However, this Article is the first
comprehensive article to examine these problems of privacy and technology specifically in light
of the pandemic, arguing that the lens of the pandemic exposes the need for both widescale and
small-scale reform of privacy law. This Article approaches these problems with a focus on
technical realities and social salience, and with a critical awareness of digital and political
inequities, crafting normative recommendations with these concepts in mind.
Understanding privacy in this time of pandemic is critical for law and policymaking
in the near future and for the long-term goals of creating a future society that protects both civil
liberties and public health. It is also important to create a contemporary scholarly understanding
of privacy in pandemic at this moment in time, as a matter of historical record. By examining
privacy in pandemic, in the midst of pandemic, this Article seeks to create a holistic scholarly
foundation for future work on privacy, technology, public health, and legal responses to global
crises.
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INTRODUCTION
Alison Schwartz, 29 years old, a People Magazine staffer in New York City.
Adolph “T.J.” Mendez, 44 years old, a father of six in New Braunfels, Texas.
Nashom Wooden, 50 years old, a drag queen in New York City.
Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy, 87 years old, a federal judge for the Southern
District of New York.
Sarah Herbert, 5 years old, the daughter of two essential workers in Detroit,
Michigan.
These1 are just five of the hundreds of thousands of people2 who have died
of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Millions more have been infected and
recovered,3 some with lasting health ramifications and some, particularly in
countries like the United States, with staggering hospital bills.4 The pandemic
has caused untold damage to people all around the world and has spurred small
to drastic shifts in the use of technology across sectors. This Article explores the
privacy aspect of new technologies and new technologically influenced
initiatives deployed as part of the COVID-19 response by both public and
private actors.
COVID-19, also known as the “novel coronavirus,” or SARS-CoV-2, is a
highly contagious virus that causes a range of symptoms in humans, often

From Buzzfeed’s moving collection of profiles, at The Victims of COVID-19, BUZZFEED
(Apr. 2, 2020, 12:38 PM ET), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/buzzfeednews/thevictims-of-covid-19.
2 See Coronavirus Tracked: The Latest Figures as Countries Fight to Contain the Pandemic, FIN.
TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/a26fbf7e-48f8-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441 (last accessed
May 21, 2020).
3 More than 13.4 million as of July 16, 2020. See Coronavirus Tracked: The Latest Figures as
Countries Fight to Contain the Pandemic, FIN. TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/a26fbf7e-48f811ea-aeb3-955839e06441 (last accessed July 16, 2020).
4 Abigail Abrams, America’s Health System Will Likely Make the Coronavirus Outbreak Worse,
TIME (Mar. 4, 2020), https://time.com/5794672/health-insurance-deductibles-coronavirus;
Abigail Abrams, Total Cost of Her COVID-19 Treatment: $34,927.43, TIME (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://time.com/5806312/coronavirus-treatment-cost.
1
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primarily attacking the respiratory system.5 There are a few unique characteristics
of COVID-19 that are important to note when examining the use of technology
in the public health, government, and corporate response to the virus. First, the
virus is fast-moving, with global reach. Though the outbreak was first declared
a Public Health Emergency by the World Health Organization on January 30,
2020,6 the virus quickly reached most parts of the world in a manner of months.
Second, the virus is deadly. As of May 2020, the virus has killed almost 300,000
worldwide,7 including 105,000 in the United States alone, as of June 3.8 Third,
the virus is highly contagious. Early research suggests it may spread through tiny
virus particles released from infected individuals, potentially transmitting
through coughs, sneezes, talking, breathing9, or potentially even through the
air.10 Fourth, the virus can be invisible. Individuals infected with the virus may
take up to two weeks to develop symptoms, and many may be completely
asymptomatic.
These four factors (fast-moving spread, contagiousness, deadliness, and
potential for invisible, asymptomatic transmission) have led to severe measures
to help stem or stop viral transmission. Social distancing11 has become the rule
for many regions, including entire nations. The concept behind social distancing
is that the virus will spread more slowly if humans do not get close enough to
each other to be in range of virus particles released from breath,12 touch, and so
on. To support social distancing, governments have shut down schools,
businesses, retail, restaurants, and more. The shutdowns have contributed to
Neel V. Patel, How Does the Coronavirus Work?, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/04/15/999476/explainer-how-does-thecoronavirus-work.
6 Rolling Updates on Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen
(last updated May 19, 2020).
7 FIN. TIMES, supra note 3.
8 Joe Fox et al., At Least 92,000 People Have Died From Coronavirus in the U.S., WASH. POST
(June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/coronavirus-uscases-deaths/.
9 How COVID-19 Spreads, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html.
10 Lisa Lockerd Maragakis, Coronavirus Disease 2019 vs. the Flu, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirusdisease-2019-vs-the-flu.
11 Josiah Bates, What Is ‘Social Distancing?’ Here’s How to Best Practice It as Coronavirus Spreads,
TIME (Mar. 11, 2020), https://time.com/5800442/social-distancing-coronavirus./
12 David Williams, How Coronavirus Spread from One Member to 87% of the Singers at a
Washington Choir Practice, CNN (May 13, 2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/13/us/coronavirus-washington-choir-outbreaktrnd/index.html; Loud Talking Could Leave Coronavirus in the Air for Up to 14 Minutes, MIT TECH.
REV. (May 13, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/13/1001696/loudtalking-could-leave-coronavirus-in-the-air-for-up-to-14-minutes.
5
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mass unemployment.13 (Over 11 million Americans lost their jobs in March 2020
alone.14) The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as well
as many states, have also encouraged people to wear masks at all times when
outside or near the presence of others.15 As of May 2020, scientists expect a
vaccine may not be ready until 2021.16
States have attempted to respond to the crisis by using technological
solutions to try to stop or slow the spread of the novel coronavirus. Many of
these solutions have been data-driven, with few if any guarantees for individual
data privacy. These technology-influenced solutions include Bluetooth tracking,
cell-phone location data tracking, various types of testing (including antigen and
antibody testing), immunity passports or certification, human and digital contact
tracing, and more. Public health responses have included increased use of
telemedicine and telehealth (often through remote communication
technologies), as well as use of medical AI and healthcare robots. Governments
have used surveillance technologies, like facial recognition and remote heat
sensing, as part of response efforts as well. As always, with new government
surveillance comes new risks and dangers to civil liberties and privacy,
particularly for marginalized populations.17
Corporations, too, have developed and implemented new technological
programs in response to this pandemic. Consumer technologies, including
remote communication technologies, have risen to the forefront. These
technologies have also been used in the work setting, as many white-collar
workers have moved to remote offices. All of these programs come with their
own risks to security and privacy. Corporate surveillance also extends to the
physical realm, as companies have instituted privacy-invasive measures like
temperature checks for employees.

13 Sylvan Lane, More Than 11 Million Laid Off in March as Coronavirus Spread Through US,
HILL (May 15, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/498005-more-than-11-million-laidoff-in-march-as-coronavirus-spread-through-us.
14 Id.
15 Recommendation Regarding the Use of Cloth Face Coverings, Especially in Areas of Significant
Community-Based Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover.html.
16 Quentin Fotrell, ‘The 1918 Spanish Flu’s Second Wave Was Even More Devastating’:
Americans Brace for Another Coronavirus Outbreak in the Fall, MARKETWATCH (May 21, 2020),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/we-will-not-have-a-vaccine-by-next-winter-whathappens-when-coronavirus-returns-2020-04-22.
17 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Mary A. Franks,
Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 441 (2017); Scott Skinner-Thompson,
Performative Privacy, 50 DAVIS L. REV.1673 (2017); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double
Standards, 93 WASH. REV 2051 (2018) [hereinafter Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double
Standards])
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Outside of government public health response and corporate employee
surveillance, individuals have seen changes in the use of technologies and
privacy protections in other sectors as well. Many corporate surveillance
technologies are also being used in the education sector, putting the privacy of
students and educators at risk. At the same time, the social distancing measures
necessary for life in a pandemic have led to an increase in the use of remote
communication technologies in private life, changing the way individuals
experience technology in the workplace, in education, and in social lives.
This Article examines privacy aspects of new technologies and
technologically-influenced public health responses that have risen to the
forefront as a result of the pandemic. Understanding privacy in this time of
pandemic is critical, both for our near future and for the long-term goals of
creating a future society that protects both civil liberties and public health.
Certainly, with the benefit of hindsight, future scholars will likely find that many
of the technological solutions proposed and implemented now were actually
unhelpful or perhaps even harmful. However, examining how privacy was
considered and understood during the pandemic will aid future scholarship and
support the efforts of others tasked with shaping laws that deal with privacy in
future global crises, in addition to adding to the longitudinal study of our
society’s ever-changing relationship with data and technology over time.
The Article first looks at public-health programs that have developed as part
of pandemic response. These programs include COVID-19 testing programs,
contact tracing programs, immunity passports, and novel uses of technology in
medicine and healthcare, including medical AI and healthcare robots. Next, the
Article explores the privacy impacts of new technologies through a variety of
sectors: government surveillance; employee surveillance; educational privacy;
and consumer privacy. Finally, the Article offers normative recommendations
for protecting privacy while also supporting public health.
While a growing body of scholarship is rapidly developing on legal issues
related to the COVID-19 pandemic18, this Article provides the first
comprehensive analysis of privacy, technology, and public health responses
across sectors. Furthermore, this Article is unique in explaining the technical
and scientific components of each of these privacy-affective technological
solutions, as well as focusing on the societal changes that have pushed the use
of these technologies and have come about as a result of these technological
changes. Most of the technologies being deployed as COVID-19 responses are
not new. As Jack M. Balkin has opined, the novelty of new technologies is not
See, e.g., this in-progress special issue of the Journal of Law and Biosciences:
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/09/pandemic-issue-journal-of-law-and-thebiosciences/
18
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what matters for understanding how the law should regulate. Rather, it is what
has changed in society that has driven the rise in certain technologies that we
should seek to understand. In creating new laws for new technologies (or new
crises), we should look to salience, not novelty.19
Finally, this article is unique in shedding light on critical dimensions of
privacy in times of pandemic, particularly impacts on marginalized groups,
including intersectional analysis of disparate harms, reflecting on Kimberlé
Crenshaw’s groundbreaking work on understanding the intersection of race,
gender, and other identities in law, politics, and theory.20 Understanding the
impact race, gender, and other dimensions have on public health, privacy, and
technology are critical, as the pandemic has highlighted inequalities throughout
society.
Much further study is needed on this subject, including empirical work on
privacy practices and responses, as well as research on disparate impact, and
comparative research on the vastly different privacy-related programs that
nations and regions have developed—influenced in no small part, to be sure, by
their unique legal and regulatory regimes. This Article focuses primarily on U.S.
privacy law, as well as privacy-related developments in the United States. The
Article does not claim to provide an exhaustive study of all potential privacy
implications of all pandemic-related interventions, but rather serves to lay the
groundwork for future scholarship on these issues.
I. PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC
There exists a long literature in bioethics and health law on concepts of
privacy and individual rights in healthcare, from the concept of informed
consent (far beyond the norms of notice and consent in privacy theory)21 to
questions of ethics in medical research and medical practice. Under the
American sector-specific privacy law regime,22 a smattering of laws governs

Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (2004).)
20 KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139.
21 Charlotte Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Future, 96 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1505 (2018).
22 Unlike in some other nations, the United States lacks omnibus privacy regulation.
Instead, privacy law is governed by an amalgamation of different laws and regulations for
specific sectors, including particular types of data, particular types of data subjects, and
particular industries. Constitutional privacy rights also come not from a clear constitutional
provision, unlike in other nations, but from a “penumbra” of privacy rights. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19
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health privacy and health technology, including HIPAA23 (and the Privacy Rule
and HITECH24), GINA,25 FTC consumer protection law,26 and state privacy
laws. Additionally, scholars like Khiara Bridges have explored privacy in
healthcare and the degrees to which different people are afforded different
privacy protections based on race, income, gender, and more.27
This section examines public-health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic,
namely: testing, immunity passports, telehealth, medical AI, and healthcare
robots. While many of the technologies used for public-health pandemic
response are not new,28 the specific pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic create
a unique lens through which to examine the use of technology for public health
response.
A. COVID-19 Testing
Since the beginning of the pandemic, states have raced to increase their
testing capabilities, in the hopes of stopping or slowing the spread of the virus.29
Testing of any kind generates data, some of it potentially identifiable. Different
public and private testing bodies have tackled testing—including public health
agencies, private clinics, employers, and education institutions. Some have
argued that there may be a moral duty for individuals to donate data for public
health purposes in this time.30 The rapidly increased scale of testing around the
world creates an increase in potential harms related to data collection, use, and
transfer. To understand the privacy dimensions of viral testing, it is first
necessary to establish a baseline understanding of the tests and the parties
involved in testing, before turning to privacy implications.

23 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 136.
24 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2018).
25 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881.
26 CHRIS HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY
(2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
27 KHIARA BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2019).
28 Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13 NEV. NEV.L.J.
722, 723-24 (2013).
29 Umair Irfan, The Case for Ending the Covid-19 Pandemic with Mass Testing, VOX (Apr. 13,
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/13/21215133/coronavirus-testing-covid-19-testsscreening.
30 Brent Mittelstadt et al., Is There a Duty to Participate in Digital Epidemiology?, LIFE SCI.,
SOC’Y & POL’Y (May 9, 2018),
https://lsspjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40504-018-0074-1.
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1. Taxonomy of COVID-19 Tests
There are three types of COVID-19 testing that have come to the forefront
in pandemic response: polymerase chain reaction tests (PCR), antigen testing,
and antibody tests.31 Each of these forms of testing produce biological
samples—primarily mucus or blood.
PCR tests are the most common and accurate tests for determining if a
person has an active COVID-19 infection.32 These tests are performed by a
healthcare provider using a long thin swab to collect a mucus sample from an
individual’s throat or nose.33 The sample is then sent to a lab (external or inhouse, if the clinic or hospital has facilities) to determine if the sample contains
COVID-19 genetic material—a process that may take a number of days to yield
results.34 The transport between testing location and lab may take up to twentyfour hours, and the test itself may take six hours to complete (though processing
time varies by lab).35
Antigen tests (or rapid diagnostic tests) detect the presence of antigens (viral
proteins) of the COVID-19 virus. These tests are significantly faster than PCR
tests, producing results in approximately fifteen minutes, according to the
CDC36 (thirty minutes according to the WHO37), and are relatively simple to
perform.38 Dr. Deborah Birx, the White House coronavirus response
Overview of Testing for SARS-CoV-2, Center for Disease Control (July 17, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/testing-overview.html, (last accessed July
24, 2020); Coronavirus Testing Basics, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (last accessed
July 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/coronavirus-testingbasics ; (Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcrantigen-antibody/index.html.
32 Id.
33 A. Pawlowski, Coronavirus Test: What Is it Like to Get the Nasal Swab for Detecting COVID19?, TODAY (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.today.com/health/coronavirus-test-what-it-getnasal-swab-detecting-covid-19-t176271.
34 Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-antigenantibody/index.html
35 Julie Appleby, Why It Takes So Long To Get Most COVID-19 Test Results, NPR (Mar. 28,
2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/28/822869504/why-it-takes-solong-to-get-most-covid-19-test-results.
36 Rapid Influenza Diagnostic Tests, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/clinician_guidance_ridt.htm.
37 Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/advice-on-theuse-of-point-of-care-immunodiagnostic-tests-for-covid-19.
38 Rapid Influenza Diagnostic Tests, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
31
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coordinator, said in April that antigen tests may be the “breakthrough” needed
to test large numbers of people in the United States, given that antigen tests are
simpler and faster than PCR tests.39 However, accurate antigen tests can be
difficult to produce and may be more likely to miss active infection; indeed, the
World Health Organization has cautioned against their use in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic due to the lack of accuracy and limited data available, as
of April 2020.40
Antibody tests (or serological tests) “measure the amount of antibodies or
proteins present in the blood when the body is responding to a specific
infection, like COVID-19.”41 Antibody tests can determine whether a person
has previously been exposed to a particular pathogen,42 by detecting whether the
person has developed antibodies in their immune system that would suggest a
prior immune response to the novel coronavirus in the body.43 (However,
antibody tests cannot differentiate between patients with active and past
infections.44) Antibody tests can be performed by collecting blood samples from
individuals. In April 2020, Germany began conducting Europe’s first nationwide
COVID-19 antibody testing program.45 The U.S. National Institutes of Health
(NIH) also embarked on a program to test 10,000 U.S. volunteers for
antibodies.46
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/clinician_guidance_ridt.htm.
39 Arman Arzad, Antigen Tests: The Coronavirus ‘Breakthrough’ That a Top White House Official
Says We Need, CNN (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/27/health/antigentests-coronavirus-breakthrough/index.html.
40 Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/advice-on-theuse-of-point-of-care-immunodiagnostic-tests-for-covid-19.
41 Press Release, Stephen M. Hahn, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Food & Drug Admin.,
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: Serological Tests (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-updateserological-tests.
42 https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/resources/COVID-19/COVID-19-factsheets/200228-Serology-testing-COVID.pdf.
43 Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcrantigen-antibody/index.html.
44
Gagan Mathur and Sweta Matur, Antibody Testing for Covid-19: Can It Be Used As a Screening
Tool in Areas with Low Prevalence?, 154 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1 (May
15, 2020).
45 Rob Schmitz, Germany Is Conducting Nationwide COVID-19 Antibody Testing, NPR (Apr.
21, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/04/21/839594202/germany-is-conducting-nationwide-covid-19-antibodytesting.
46 Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to Go Back to School
or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/health/coronavirus-antibody-test.html.
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At this time, it is still uncertain how strong immunity might be or how long
it might last.47 There have been cases of people testing positive twice (likely due
to having higher levels of antibodies when first tested and lower level of
antibodies when tested later), seemingly not developing immunity to the virus.48
Antibody tests may also have a problem with accuracy,49 especially because the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has issued a policy allowing developers
of some serological tests to bring to market their tests without prior FDA
review.50 In April 2020, the WHO recommended against the use of antibody
tests as diagnostics for patient care, but encouraged their use for “disease
surveillance and epidemiological research.”51
Some have suggested the use of antibody tests to “re-open” society52 as the
Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-antigenantibody/index.html; Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to
Go Back to School or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020),;
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/health/coronavirus-antibody-test.html.
48John Bacon, Can you get infected with COVID-19 twice? Experts say possibility is
'certainly real', USA TODAY (July 16, 2020, 3:17 PM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/07/16/covid-19-can-you-get-infectedtwice-herd-immunity/5429012002/
49 Gagan Mathur and Sweta Matur, Antibody Testing for Covid-19: Can It Be Used As a
Screening Tool in Areas with Low Prevalence?, 154 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY
1 (May 15, 2020); Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to Go
Back to School or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/health/coronavirus-antibody-test.html.
50 Press Release, Stephen M. Hahn, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Food & Drug Admin.,
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: Serological Tests, https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-serological-tests.
51 Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/advice-on-theuse-of-point-of-care-immunodiagnostic-tests-for-covid-19.
52 See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Bryce Nesbitt, The ‘Certified Recovered’ from Covid-19 Could Lead the
Economic Recovery, STAT (Apr. 6. 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/06/the-certifiedrecovered-from-covid-19-could-lead-the-economic-recovery; Opinion, Ezekiel J. Emanuel, We
Can Safely Restart the Economy in June. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/coronavirus-economy.html; Veronika
Hackenbroch, Große Antikörperstudie Soll Immunität Der Deutschen Gegen Covid-19 Feststellen, DER
SPIEGEL (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-grosseantikoerper-studie-soll-immunitaet-der-deutschen-feststellen-a-c8c64a33-5c0f-4630-bd7348c17c1bad23; Jason Horowitz, In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right
Antibodies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-coronavirus-antibodies.html;
Carolyn Y. Johnson, Testing Coronavirus Survivors’ Blood Could Help Reopen U.S., WASH. POST
(Mar. 31, 2020, 12:35 PM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/31/coronavirus-serology-blood-tests.
47
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pandemic slows. These tests could be used to determine or prove immunity to
the virus, a form of validation that could then be used for “immunity passports”
that could allow individuals to do certain types of work, travel, or do other
higher risk activities.53 These immunity passports (and related proposals) come
with a host of privacy, algorithmic accountability, and digital inequity issues,54 as
discussed later in this paper. However, it is uncertain if antibody tests can be
used as an effective screening tool to allow re-opening of schools or businesses
in areas with high prevalence of COVID-1955, regardless of how immunity
passport proposals develop.
2. Taxonomy of Testing Actors
When discussing privacy, it is always critical to determine which actors are
involved in collecting, using, sharing, and storing data. As the pandemic
progresses, a number of agents have become involved in testing. The publicprivate divide may be a less useful distinction here, as many testing programs
have developed as public-private partnerships (which itself raises a number of
issues in terms of regulatory oversight). For example, the controversial data
analytics company Palantir Technologies partnered with the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Center for Disease Control, with the
technology company offering “data tools … to ‘clean’ and ‘harmonize’ the
information flowing in from local hospitals, states and other sources related to
the virus.”56
Some nations have implemented national testing campaigns for public
health. For example, in April 2020, Germany began conducting Europe’s first
See, e.g., https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/31/coronavirus-serology-bloodtests/; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-coronavirusantibodies.html; https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/06/the-certified-recovered-from-covid19-could-lead-the-economic-recovery/;
https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-grosse-antikoerper-studie-sollimmunitaet-der-deutschen-feststellen-a-c8c64a33-5c0f-4630-bd73-48c17c1bad23;
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/coronavirus-economy.html
53 Lydia Smith, Germany to Introduce Coronavirus ‘Immunity Certificates’ for Recovered Public,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/germany-antibodies-tests-generalpublic-immunity-certificates-1494934.
54 Henry T. Greely, Covid-19 ‘Immunity Certificates’: Practical and Ethical Conundrums, STAT
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/10/immunity-certificates-covid-19practical-ethical-conundrums.
55
Gagan Mathur and Sweta Matur, Antibody Testing for Covid-19: Can It Be Used As a Screening
Tool in Areas with Low Prevalence?, 154 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1 (May
15, 2020);
56 Jackson Barnett, Inside Palantir’s work with the CDC, HHS to synthesize COVID-19 data,
FEDSCOOP (April 2, 2020), https://www.fedscoop.com/palantir-covid-19-coronavirus-datacdc-hhs/.
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nationwide COVID-19 antibody testing program.57 The U.S. NIH also
embarked on a much more limited program to test 10,000 U.S. volunteers for
antibodies.58 Across the United States, states, counties, and cities have developed
testing campaigns, some as public programs and some as public-private
partnerships.59
In the absence of, or perhaps in addition to, federally-driven nationwide
testing in the U.S., this mishmash network of testing programs has created a
fairly large cast of characters—parties that could be considered data controllers
or processors60 for data generated from COVID-19 related testing. (While the
U.S. does not generally use the data controller vs. processor framework61 for
privacy regulation, it can be a useful metric for understanding the roles of
different actors in the data lifecycle of COVID-19 testing.)
The parties involved at the primary point of collection include private
companies (particularly in technology and healthcare industries), universities and
research centers, hospitals and healthcare providers, governments, and—in the
case of distributed or open data projects—potentially the public. Many of these
would fulfill a data controller-like role. U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
privacy regulation would also apply to many testing actors collecting data or
performing testing.62
Third parties that may obtain or have interest in COVID-19 testing data
include relevant health and technology companies and organizations, as well as
(potentially) downstream commercial actors, including data brokers and
unrelated companies that may wish to use the data for other purposes (e.g.,
57 Rob Schmitz, Germany Is Conducting Nationwide COVID-19 Antibody Testing, NPR (Apr.
21, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/04/21/839594202/germany-is-conducting-nationwide-covid-19-antibodytesting.
58 Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to Go Back to School
or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/health/coronavirus-antibody-test.html.
59 See, e.g., https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/30/hhs-extends-covid-19-testingpublic-private-partnership.html
60 In E.U. data protection law, most notably in the General Data Protection Regulation, a
data controller “determines the purposes for which and the means by which personal data is
processed,” while a data processor processes the data on behalf of a controller. See
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-andorganisations/obligations/controller-processor/what-data-controller-or-data-processor_en
61
Jones, Meg and Kaminski, Margot E., An American's Guide to the GDPR (June 5,
2020). Denver Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 1, 2020.
62 For example, private companies conducting testing would likely fall under FTC
jurisdiction regarding unfair and misleading practices involved with testing and promises made
to consumers.
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marketing health products). Additionally, government actors may have or may
obtain access to COVID-19 testing data—both for direct COVID-19 response
purposes as well as potentially other purposes, including government
surveillance and law enforcement. Finally, no system is ever fully secure, so with
any collection of COVID-19 testing data, there will always be the threat of bad
actors accessing or obtaining data. These bad actors could potentially include
foreign state actors, leading to national security concerns.
It is useful to understand which actors are involved throughout the data
lifecycle of data obtained from or generated by COVID-19 testing, particularly
for regulators and policymakers who wish to govern these practices and actors,
as well as for individuals to later seek legal or other recourse.
3. Taxonomy of COVID Data
There are many types of data relevant to a privacy analysis of the COVID19 testing process. It is beyond the scope of this paper (and not useful, perhaps)
to attempt to define every type of data in every possible taxonomy. However,
here are a few important categories of data to consider when thinking about
privacy and COVID-19 testing.
COVID-19 testing, be it polymerase chain reaction tests (PCR), antigen
testing, or antibody tests,63 involves collecting biological samples—primarily
mucus or blood. These samples are then analyzed to determine if a person has
been exposed to the virus or has a current viral infection. Different forms of
data are generated by COVID-19 testing. These include the biological samples
or specimens, of course, but also more data collected and generated throughout
the process.
Consider, for example, the health data connected to the patient that is
collected when individuals enter the primary point of collection (e.g., testing
center, hospital, research center). If a patient signs in at the front desk of a
hospital, that is data that could potentially be linked to data generated by the
person’s testing process. Data collectors (e.g., hospitals and researchers) may ask
additional questions (e.g., asking for symptoms) during the testing process, and
individuals may offer additional data (e.g., demographic data). Other biological
samples may also be taken, for analysis of other factors that are not directly
related to COVID-19 viral presence. The analysis phase (where biological
samples are analyzed by labs) can produce more data, including but not limited
63 Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-antigenantibody/index.html.
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to data determining COVID-19 exposure.
A non-exhaustive list of types of data that may be generated throughout the
COVID-19 testing lifecycle include:
• Biological samples (including samples used for COVID-19 detection as
well as other samples)
• Genetic data (obtained from biological samples or from other
sources)64
• Health data (obtained throughout the process)
• Other personal data, broadly defined65
Health data is a broad category, and different laws define categories of data
that merit special protection. For example, HIPAA protects “protected health
information” (PHI), which is defined as “individually identifiable health
information” that is “transmitted by electronic media; maintained in electronic
media; or transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.”66 HIPAA
does not cover the protection of health-related information that is not
transmitted through the statutorily defined means or the protection of health
information that may be arguably non-identifiable and does not protect other
categories of information related to health. For example, Mason Marks has also
identified “emerging medical data,” data from social media and other sources,
that could effectively provide the same insights as traditional health data.67 This
is a category of data that is not covered by existing U.S. laws on health privacy.
Genetic information is defined in (among other places) the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), one of the leading genetic data
laws in the United States. GINA defines genetic information, as, with respect to
any individual, “information about (i) such individual’s’ genetic tests, (ii) the
genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifestation of
a disease or disorder in family members of such individual.”68 GINA defines a
genetic test as a “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or
For example, 23andMe’s study relied on its existing databank of genetic information
collected previously. See Megan Molteni, Why Does Covid-19 Make Some People So Sick? Ask Their
DNA, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/why-does-covid-19-make-somepeople-so-sick-ask-their-dna.
65 The distinction between personally identifiable data and data deemed to not be
personally identifiable has not been found to be useful in practice, as many forms of data can
be re-identifiable. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLAL.REV.1701 (2010).
But cf. Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011).
66 45 CFR § 160.103 (2019).
67 Mason Marks, Emergent Medical Data: Health Information Inferred by Artificial Intelligence, 11
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming (2021), ).https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554118.
68 42 U.S.C.USCS § 300gg–91(d)(16) (2018).
64
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metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes,”
excluding (i) analysis of proteins or metabolites that does not detect genotypes,
mutations, or chromosomal changes; or (ii) an analysis of proteins or
metabolites that is directly related to a manifested disease, disorder, or
pathological condition that could reasonably be detected by a healthcare
professional with appropriate training and expertise in the field of medicine
involved.69
HIPAA also includes genetic information as potentially falling under the
umbrella of PHI. The Privacy Rule “(1) revise[d] the definition of ‘‘health
information’’ to make clear that the term includes ‘‘genetic information;’’ and (2)
add[ed] definitions for the GINA-related terms of ‘‘family member,’’ ‘‘genetic
information,’’ ‘‘genetic services,’’ ‘‘genetic test,’’ and ‘‘manifestation or
manifested;’’70 HIPAA’s genetic information definition includes the categories of
information covered under the definition of genetic information under GINA as
well as “any request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical
research which includes genetic services, by the individual or any family member
of the individual.”71
Some of the data collected or processed in the testing data lifecycle might
qualify as genetic data—or might deserve the special protections afforded to
genetic data. Genetic data is particularly important to protect due to the
importance genes have to our conceptions of identity and self. Alondra Nelson
has described the “special status afforded to DNA as the final arbiter of truth
of identity”72 and has called DNA “the ultimate big data.”73 The unique
sensitivity of genetic data is also important to keep in mind in the debate over
immunity passports based on antibody tests.
Additionally, health privacy laws often fail to recognize non-health
information that is also at risk with health information disclosures. Other
personal data may include demographic data, data on social or personal habits
that may not be health-related in nature, as well as data that could appear on
first glance to be unrelated to the COVID-19 testing lifecycle. Disclosure of
non-health data can also lead to privacy harms. For example, one coronavirus
outbreak in South Korea was traced to a nightlife area that included many clubs
popular with the local LGBTQ community. In disclosing the source of the
42 U.S.C.USCS § 300gg–91 (d)(17) (2018).
HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information, 74 Fed. Red.FR 51698 (Oct. 7, 2009).
71
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019).
72 ALONDRA NELSON, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF DNA: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND
RECONCILIATION AFTER THE GENOME 4 (2016).
73 Id.
69
70
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outbreak, health authorities potentially jeopardized the safety of the LGBTQ
people who had frequented the district in secret.74
It is important to understand which types of data are being collected and
processed throughout the COVID-19 testing lifecycle, because different types
of data sometimes need different legal and regulatory protections. For example,
health data and genetic data merit special protection under different laws and
regulations in the U.S. sector-specific privacy regime. Personal data not directly
related to health or genetics also merits protection, particularly personal data
that is easily identifiable. Biological samples or specimens may need different
security protections than digital data. Other data that does not fall easily into any
of the above categories should not be excluded from protection either,
particularly given the ability for downstream data aggregators to amass large data
sets that could then lead to reidentification.
4. Understanding the COVID-19 Testing Data Lifecycle
To understand the data flow and lifecycle of data generated from testing,
start at the beginning.
First, a person gives a sample (biological or data, as in survey responses) to
a primary data collector. This first phase—the primary point of collection—may
involve multiple primary data collectors. For example, a person may go to a
drive-through testing center, jointly managed by the state government, a local
hospital, and private testing companies. Thus, at the primary point of collection,
a number of parties may have control over the data and qualify as data
controllers as traditionally understood.
The primary data collection from COVID-19 testing takes place at a number
of points of collection: traditional healthcare settings (e.g., hospitals, primary
care practices); new testing facilities (e.g., COVID-19 specific drive-through
testing centers)75; public and private research settings (e.g., 23andMe’s genetic
study76 and UCSF’s citizen science epidemiology app77); and distributed or open
74 https://time.com/5836699/south-korea-coronavirus-lgbtq-itaewon/;
https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-coronavirus-efforts-spark-privacy-concerns-ingay-community-11589306659
75 Press Release, Governor Cuomo Opens the State’s First Drive-through COVID-19
Mobile Testing Center in New Rochelle, Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-opens-states-first-drive-through-covid19-mobile-testing-center-new-rochelle-0.
76 Megan Molteni, Why Does Covid-19 Make Some People So Sick? Ask Their DNA, WIRED
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/why-does-covid-19-make-some-people-sosick-ask-their-dna.
77 Jeff Norris, New COVID-19 ‘Citizen Science’ Initiative Lets Any Adult with a Smartphone
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networks.78 In early May 2020, the FDA approved the first at-home saliva test
for COVID-19,79 following its emergency authorization for the first at-home
nasal swab testing kit in April 2020.80 For this emergency authorization, the FDA
relied81 on the public health emergency powers given to it under Section 564(a)
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.82 Thus, an individual’s home
setting may also be a location for primary collection of samples and data, and an
individual (or friends or family) may be the primary collector of the sample.
The second phase of the data lifecycle for testing data is analysis of the
sample. In this phase, the primary data collector either (1) conducts analysis
itself; or (2) transfers the data for analysis by another party. For example, a drivethrough testing center could transfer the biological samples to a lab for analysis.
Alternatively, a hospital may have the resources to both collect a sample and
analyze it in an in-house lab. An individual using a home testing kit could send
in the kit to the lab. In this analysis phase of the COVID-19 data lifecycle, data
may be accessed, stored, and shared by parties that may be data processors or
may be both processor and controller.83
The first two phases of the COVID-19 testing data lifecycle are relatively
clear. However, as with all data collection, it is difficult to fully predict the flow
of data the further downstream you get from the primary point of collection.
Results of tests may be transferred to other entities, either by the individual who
was tested, or by any of the testing data processors, data collectors, or data
Help to Fight Coronavirus, U.C. SAN FRANCISCO (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2020/03/417026/new-covid-19-citizen-science-initiative-letsany-adult-smartphone-help-fight.
78 Science Friday: Citizen Scientists: Submit Your COVID-19 Symptoms (Or Lack Of Them),
WNYC (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.sciencefriday.com/segments/citizen-science-covid-19;
Paul Sisson, Door Knobs, Trash Cans, Gas Pumps: Citizen Scientists Search for Coronavirus on Everyday
Surfaces, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (May 14, 2020);
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/health/story/2020-05-14/door-knobs-trashcans-gas-pumps-citizen-scientists-enlisted-to-help-find-coronavirus-on-everyday-surfaces.
79 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., to Christian
Bixby, Assistant Dir., Research & Clinical Lab Servs., Rutgers Clinical Genomics Lab., Rutgers
Univ. (May 7, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137773/download; Sheila Kaplan &
Natasha Singer, F.D.A. Clears First Home Saliva Test for Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/health/fda-coronavirus-spit-test.html.
80 Katie Thomas & Natasha Singer, F.D.A. Authorizes First In-Home Test for Coronavirus,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/health/fda-in-hometest-coronavirus.html.
81 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin. to Christian
Bixby, Assistant Dir., Research & Clinical Lab Servs., Rutgers Clinical Genomics Lab., Rutgers
Univ. (May 7, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137773/download.
82 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–3 (2018).
83 Jones, Meg and Kaminski, Margot E., An American's Guide to the GDPR (June 5,
2020). Denver Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 1, 2020.
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controllers. The transfer may be done intentionally or unintentionally, for the
purposes specified at point of collection or not. This may include releasing
information to the public about people who may have been infected with the
virus. For example, places of business may post notices if an employee tests
positive, or local governments may post information about large events an
infected person had visited. Data from various sources may eventually find its
way to data aggregators, who may repackage the data with data from many
sources, increasing the chances of reidentification and potential harm (including
algorithmic harms) to data subjects.
Understanding the lifecycle of testing data is key for identifying the points
at which regulation can have the greatest impact on protecting privacy.
5. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Testing Data Privacy
It is helpful to break down the legal and regulatory landscape by identifying
at which points law might apply to protect privacy rights. This includes
identifying which actors the law can regulate, as well as identifying which actions
or settings the law can govern. While testing for disease is not new, the scale at
which testing has progressed is new and arguably not contemplated in current
privacy laws.
The American privacy regime lacks a comprehensive federal privacy
regulation. However, the United States has a number of sector-specific privacy
laws and regulations that would likely pertain to the type of testing done for
COVID-19 response.
a. Regulating by Data Type
For the types of data gathered in testing, we can look to regulations and legal
protections for health data, genetic data, and other data. There are a number of
laws that create special protections for health information as well as genetic
information (sometimes separately, sometimes categorized as health
information).
The United States also has federal laws specifically protecting privacy for
health information. HIPAA,84 the HIPAA Privacy Rule codified in 2002,85 and
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat 1936 (1996).)
85 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§160, 164 (2019)); s). ee also Health Insurance
Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160,
162, 164 (2019)); ),HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390
(Feb. 16, 2006) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019));). Modifications to the HIPAA
Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information
84
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2009’s HITECH (the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act, particularly important for tightening legal protections in
HIPAA) award special protection to personal health information. HIPAA
includes protections for electronic health information transmission, primarily
through the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule found in Section II.
However, these protections are quite limited. First, the regulations only
apply to “covered entities” and, to some extent, their “business associates.”
Covered entities often include hospitals and clinics, but do not include many
other actors that might be data collectors in the COVID-19 testing process.
Under HIPAA, the covered entities that must comply with HIPAA obligations
include health care providers (e.g., doctors, clinics, psychologists, dentists,
nursing homes) that transmit information in an electronic form in connection
with a transaction for which HIPAA applies. Covered entities also include health
care clearinghouses (entities that process health information from other entities)
as well as health plans (e.g., health insurance companies, HMOs, company health
plans). For example, if there are no covered entities involved in the data lifecycle
of a particular testing program, actors like university research centers would
likely be able to evade HIPAA regulation, as would private companies like
23andMe. This could easily happen, if non-covered entities engage in their own
testing or data collection programs. These programs then would lack the
protections awarded under a HIPAA-compliant regime.
Second, HIPAA only awards protections to data that is electronically
transmitted from a covered entity. While the regulation includes security
requirements (under the Security Rule), there is little protection against more
distributed downstream uses of data, which would be difficult to enforce. For
example, the law does not include enforcement mechanisms for improper
transfer of data by a third party who receives information from a business
associate of a covered entity. Finally, HIPAA is a consent-based regime. That is,
under HIPAA, covered entities and their business associates are free to collect,
use, and share data as long as individuals provide their consent to such practices.
Many scholars have noted the flaws of notice and consent regimes,86 and these
flaws are readily apparent in the COVID-19 testing context. Furthermore, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) already relaxed some of
these HIPAA restrictions, given the medical needs raised by the pandemic.87 It
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164
(2019)).).
86 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV.
HARV.L. REV. REV.1880, 1894 (2013); Charlotte Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice
for Patients of the Future, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1505 (2018)..
87 COVID-19 & HIPAA Bulletin: Limited Waiver of HIPAA Sanctions and Penalties During a
Nationwide Public
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is likely that greater regulatory leniency may come as the pandemic progresses.
In the United States, genetic data is given increased protections through
genetic nondiscrimination laws like GINA and some state laws that protect
information including genetic information. GINA, however, is quite limited,
only regulating health plans and employers and only in the context of
discrimination. Many have argued for expansion of legal protection for genetic
information, potentially including new laws on genetic privacy88 and genetic
discrimination.89 For example, Ifeoma Ajunwa has called for the creation of a
new tort of genetic information disclosure as well as more rigorous informed
consent guidelines for genetic testing.90 Ajunwa has also called for strengthening
GINA to add a disparate impact cause of action,91 addressing gaps in the antidiscrimination law.
Another key law for genetic privacy in this context is the 21st Century Cures
Act, which gives research subjects certain safeguards over their genetic
Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2020),)
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-and-covid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin508.pdf;; Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the
COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 17,
2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergencypreparedness/notification-enforcement-discretiontelehealth/index.html;https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/specialtopics/emergency-preparedness/notification-enforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html;
Office of Civil Rightshttps://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf;
, COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to Law Enforcement, Paramedics, Other First Responders and
Public Health Authorities, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf; Office
of Civil Rights, Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. DEPT.
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocrbulletin-3-28-20.pdf; Office of Civil Rights, FAQs on Telehealth and HIPAA During the COVID19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf.
88 Mason Marks & Tiffany Li, DNA Donors Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic
Privacy, STAT (May 30, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-geneticprivacy-nih; Megan Molteni, The US Urgently Needs New Genetic Privacy Laws, WIRED (May 1,
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-urgently-needs-new-genetic-privacy-laws.
https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-urgently-needs-new-genetic-privacy-laws/;
https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-genetic-privacy-nih/
89 Mason Marks & Tiffany Li, DNA Donors Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic
Privacy, STAT (May 30, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-geneticprivacy-nih; Megan Molteni, The US Urgently Needs New Genetic Privacy Laws, WIRED (May 1,
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-urgently-needs-new-genetic-privacy-laws.,
90 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Torts and Contract Law Issues, 75 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1225 (2014).
91 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.Rights- Civil L. L. REV.
75 ( 2016).
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information in the context of federally funded research.92 The 21st Century Cures
Act includes, for example, that certain researchers “shall not disclose or provide
any other person not connected with the research the name of [patient or test
subject] or any information, document, or biospecimen that contains
identifiable, sensitive information about such an individual and that was created
or compiled for purposes of research.”93 However, disclosure of the protected
types of information is still allowed under certain conditions, including “for the
purposes of other scientific research that is in compliance with applicable
Federal regulations governing the protection of human subjects in research”94
as well as if the disclosure if “made with the consent of the individuals to whom
the information, document, or biospecimen pertains.”95 It is also important to
note that the privacy protections for research subjects, patients, and data donors
under the 21st Century Cures Act includes a limitation that limits the use of
“identifiable, sensitive information” in legal process, including preventing such
information from being admissible as evidence.96
Thus, if genetic information is collected as part of the coronavirus testing
data lifecycle, there are a few specific contexts where genetic privacy legal
protections would apply. However, with GINA and the 21st Century Cures Act,
as with HIPAA, consent is a qualifying exception that can eliminate privacy
protections in many cases. It is quite possible that a research subject (e.g., person
getting a COVID-19 test as part of a larger medical-research study) could sign
away their rights without fully understanding the scope of their consent.
Furthermore, these laws protect against discrimination and against specific types
of data transfer. They do not protect broader privacy rights.
Outside the U.S. federal context, other jurisdictions also often create special
regulations for health data, biometric data, or genetic data. For example, the
E.U.’s General Data Protection Regulation regards health data as a special
category, thus necessitating special protections for collection and processing.97
A number of U.S. states also have particular laws that govern biometric and
health information, including the Illinois Biometric Information Protection Act
(BIPA).98 BIPA is currently one of the strongest biometric privacy laws in the
United States. Under BIPA, businesses that collect biometric information must
receive written consent from individuals before data collection, and they must
provide notice on policies for data usage and retention. Critically, BIPA allows
42 U.S.C. §USC 201 (2018).
42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)USC 201(B) (2018).
94 42 U.S.C. §USC 241(d)(1)(C)(iv) (2018).
95 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)USC 201 (C)(iii) (2018).
96 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)USC 201 (E) (2018).
97 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2016 O.J.
(L 119) 1, Recital 35.
98 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ILCS14 (2019).
92
93
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for a private right of action. Other states are also considering similar legislation.
b. Regulating by Actor and Setting
Some data processors and controllers in the testing-data lifecycle would be
considered covered entities under HIPAA, GINA, or other laws and
regulations. Many public institutions, particularly public-health institutions,
would find themselves regulated by one or more of these laws and regulations.
However, as noted, many health-privacy laws have gaps—the most glaring of
which is the lack of accountability for private actors, especially actors that are
not traditionally healthcare providers.
For private data controllers and data processors, the FTC has broad
authority over privacy practices.99 The common way the FTC has held
companies to account over privacy violations has been to note where companies
have failed their publicly stated obligations and promises to consumers, thus
falling under the FTC’s purview to enforce rules on unfair or deceptive
practices.100 Data collectors like 23andMe and private research or health
companies could be subject to FTC jurisdiction and thus enforcement in this
way. The FTC also has broad enforcement authority over companies that engage
in unfair, misleading, or fraudulent activity, which would include any testing
actors that misrepresent their testing capabilities or other abilities, in addition to
and including privacy or security practices. State attorneys general also have
authority to bring actions against companies for privacy violations as well as
unfair practices or misleading or fraudulent activity.
No system is perfectly secure, and every actor in the data lifecycle has the
potential for suffering a data breach. If this were to happen, state data breach
laws would likely apply. In case of data breach, companies could be found to
have violated their obligations under HIPAA’s Security Rule and Breach
Notification Rule, as well as their obligations to act in ways that are not
misleading or unrepresentative of their stated practices (thus triggering FTC
enforcement). For organizations not covered under HIPAA, the FTC Health
Breach Notification Rule101 requires compliance with notification procedures in
case of data breach related to health information. Additionally, other parties
involved in the data lifecycle may have a claim against the breached party, on
the basis that the breached party failed in its contractual obligations to other
parties.
99 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).);
100 See, e.g., https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settlesftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were
101 16 C.F.R. 318 (2019).
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Many of the harms from COVID-19 testing relate to downstream data
usage. Here, the law provides far less protection.102 On a fundamental level, it is
difficult for individuals to know exactly where their data goes, past the initial
point of collection, or to grasp the full extent of potential data harms—making
it next to impossible for individuals to knowingly consent103 to all the
downstream privacy harms that could occur. Data may be shared, sold, or rented
with third parties, that could include other actors within the testing ecosystem
as well as unrelated parties, like other research centers for related and unrelated
projects, as well as commercial actors, like companies seeking to profit from
tailored marketing and behavioral advertising,104 and government actors, like
law-enforcement agencies seeking to use genetic information to identify
suspects.105
Law enforcement can access data, even health and genetic data, stored in
private or public collections, through various means, including simply buying
data outright. Data collectors or data holders may also sell or freely share data
with law enforcement, which could lead to greater surveillance and related
harms, particularly important for marginalized communities. Genetic
information is particularly interesting to mention, as the genetic information of
any one person could potentially be used to identify many people in their genetic
family line. In numerous cases, law enforcement have been able to identify
potential suspects by matching DNA samples with DNA data of distant
relatives.106 There are few laws, or even proposed laws, that would protect
against these downstream privacy harms.
Few laws even contemplate data brokers, aggregators who buy data from
multiple sources, package that data together, and then resell to other parties. The
privacy harms of data collection are amplified by the process of aggregation
(through what Daniel Solove has called “the multiplier problem”107), as data
102

For example, while HIPAA arguably should apply to business associates and business
associate subcontractors, in practice, the law is rarely enforced against any actors that are not
qualified entities.
103 Charlotte Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Future, 96 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1505 (2018).
104 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 273 (2012).
105 Megan Molteni, The Key to Cracking Cold Cases Might Be Genealogy Sites, WIRED (June 1,
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/police-will-crack-a-lot-more-cold-cases-with-dna.
106 Megan Molteni, The Key to Cracking Cold Cases Might Be Genealogy Sites, WIRED (June 1,
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/police-will-crack-a-lot-more-cold-cases-with-dna.
107 Daniel J. Solove, Why the Law Often Doesn’t Recognize Privacy and Data Security Harms,
TEACHPRIVACY (July 9, 2014), https://teachprivacy.com/law-often-doesnt-recognize-privacydata-security-harms.
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becomes more identifiable with more data from other sources.108 For example,
a company like 23andMe could collect symptom information from its
consumers, match that with the genetic information from its database, and sell
that to a third party data broker. That data broker could purchase the data and
resell it to insurers who could then identify which people, or which groups of
people, would be more likely to contract COVID-19, then increasing the rates
for insurance for those people. These downstream data harms are especially
problematic given the likelihood of future connected health technologies, both
public and private, including what Andrea Matwyshyn has termed the “Internet
of Bodies.”109 There are no federal laws, and only a few state laws and proposals,
that deal with data brokers specifically. U.S. laws do not protect against these
downstream, distributed harms. Furthermore, even where law could regulate
against these harms, there has often been a lack of strong enforcement actions
by regulators.
B. Immunity Passports and Verification Mechanisms
A number of people have proposed using immunity passports or certificates
that would indicate someone has developed antibody resistance to COVID19.110 In April 2020, Germany began conducting Europe’s first nationwide
COVID-19 antibody testing program.111 Researchers at the Hemholtz Centre
for Infection Research in Braunschweig proposed a project which would include
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1880 (2013)..,
109 Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW 1 (2019).
110 See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Bryce Nesbitt, The ‘Certified Recovered’ from Covid-19 Could Lead
the Economic Recovery, STAT (Apr. 6. 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/06/thecertified-recovered-from-covid-19-could-lead-the-economic-recovery; Opinion, Ezekiel J.
Emanuel, We Can Safely Restart the Economy in June. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/coronavirus-economy.html; Jason
Horowitz, In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right Antibodies, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2020),https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/31/coronavirus-serologyblood-tests/; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-coronavirusantibodies.html; Veronika Hackenbroch, Große Antikörperstudie Soll Immunität Der Deutschen
Gegen Covid-19 Feststellen, DER SPIEGEL (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-grosse-antikoerper-studie-sollimmunitaet-der-deutschen-feststellen-a-c8c64a33-5c0f-4630-bd73-48c17c1bad23; Carolyn Y.
Johnson, Testing Coronavirus Survivors’ Blood Could Help Reopen U.S., WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2020,
12:35 PM EDT),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-coronavirusantibodies.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/31/coronavirusserology-blood-tests.https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/06/the-certified-recovered-fromcovid-19-could-lead-the-economic-recovery/;
111 Rob Schmitz, Germany Is Conducting Nationwide COVID-19 Antibody Testing, NPR (Apr.
21, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/04/21/839594202/germany-is-conducting-nationwide-covid-19-antibodytesting.
108
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mass testing for antibodies as well as immunity certificates (“similar to a
vaccination certificate”112) that would allow people certain exceptions from
COVID-19 restrictions, e.g., limitations on travel or non-essential work.113
Scientists in Italy have also proposed similar programs, as has New York
Governor Andrew Cuomo.114
Immunity passports or certificates come with many issues, including privacy.
Immunity verification requires testing to determine the presence of antibodies
that could imply immunity (temporary or permanent). As discussed above,
testing in general generates a host of privacy issues, regardless of which party is
collecting, processing, sharing, or controlling the data. Requiring or encouraging
immunity verification for employment, housing, education, or even for entering
a movie theater or shopping center could lead to an increase in testing, and thus
a compounding of the privacy harms related to testing. Electronic transfer of
immunity-related data also raises privacy risks, which may necessitate new
guidelines around HIPAA and other laws that govern health information
(potentially including Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) limitations for
employee data as well). Regulations have already been relaxed during
pandemic.115
112 Lydia Smith, Germany to Introduce Coronavirus ‘Immunity Certificates’ for Recovered Public,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/germany-antibodies-tests-generalpublic-immunity-certificates-1494934 (quoting in translation
https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-grosse-antikoerper-studie-sollimmunitaet-der-deutschen-feststellen-a-c8c64a33-5c0f-4630-bd73-48c17c1bad23).
113 Lydia Smith, Germany to Introduce Coronavirus ‘Immunity Certificates’ for Recovered Public,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/germany-antibodies-tests-generalpublic-immunity-certificates-1494934.
114 Jason Horowitz, In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right Antibodies,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italycoronavirus-antibodies.html.
115 See, e.g., COVID-19 & HIPAA Bulletin: Limited Waiver of HIPAA Sanctions and Penalties
During a Nationwide Public
Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-and-covid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin508.pdf; Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the
COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 17,
2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergencypreparedness/notification-enforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html; Office of Civil
Rights, COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to Law Enforcement, Paramedics, Other First Responders
and Public Health Authorities, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf; Office
of Civil Rights, Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. DEPT.
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocrbulletin-3-28-20.pdf; Office of Civil Rights, FAQs on Telehealth and HIPAA During the COVID19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf.
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Encouraging testing for immunity verification can lead to individuals feeling
compelled to take tests, regardless of their concerns over privacy or other issues.
People may feel compelled to participate in testing, particularly if testing is
necessary for immunity verification that can lead to employment. This lack of
control over personal health data could be harmful for privacy, or at least to a
person’s perception of their own control over personal privacy. Normalizing
this form of widespread testing and sharing of private health or genetic data with
multiple corporate and government interests could also create change in our
society’s expectations of privacy, with harmful consequences for future privacy
norms and laws.
Conditioning employment, housing, education, travel, or other rights and
privileges on immunity verification could have dangerous consequences.
Immunity passport or verification programs could create a lasting shift in social
norms, laying the groundwork for future programs that use genetics or health
status as conditions for accessing certain rights and privileges. On the extreme
end, this line of argumentation could be used to justify programs that edge close
to eugenics,116 privileging some based on health, physical ability, or innate
genetic characteristics. Normalizing immunological discrimination could pave
the way for a loosening of discrimination laws and practices generally,
particularly related to health discrimination, as well as for certain sectors, like
employment.
These problems with immunity passports have historical antecedents.
Kathryn Olivarius has written about the complex interplay between health and
capital in the “immunocapital” economy of the Yellow Fever epidemic of the
early 1900s.117 Connecting the past immunity economy to the proposed
immunity passports of the COVID-19 era, Olivarius writes:
Immunity on a case-by-case basis did permit the economy to
expand, but it did so unevenly: to the benefit of those already
atop the social ladder, and at the expense of everyone else. When
a raging virus collided with the forces of capitalism,
immunological discrimination became just one more form of
bias in a region already premised on racial, ethnic, gender and
financial inequality.118
Widespread immunity verification programs could effectively create the
Godwin’s Law, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin's_law.
Kathryn Olivarius, Immunity, Capital, and Power in Antebellum New Orleans, 124 AM. HIST.
REV. 425 (2019).
118 Kathryn Olivarius, The Dangerous History of Immunoprivilege, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/opinion/coronavirus-immunity-passports.html.
116
117
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“immunological discrimination” Olivarius describes, leading to discriminatory
effects on marginalized and disadvantaged groups. For example, if some jobs
are conditioned on immunity verification, people might be willing to voluntarily
infect themselves with COVID-19 in order to gain the immunity, and by proxy,
the immunity verification needed for employment. This particular risk to
individual health would likely be greater for the unemployed and
underemployed, and other people who would find the financial incentive strong
enough to overcome the risks to their own health. As Olivarius notes, the use
of immunity verification as condition for employment shifts the burden on the
working classes to become “acclimated” to the virus, not on those in power to
invest in societal infrastructure.119
Additionally, immunity testing and verification may not be available equally
to all people. For example, people who lack medical insurance (particularly in
countries like the United States, without free or low-cost public healthcare) may
be unwilling or unable to get the testing needed to receive immunity verification.
Thus, if immunity verification were to become a standard, already disadvantaged
people would not be able to access the same benefits from immunity verification
that others would.
Black people, indigenous people, and people from other marginalized
groups may have greater resistance to enrolling in any public health database or
government data collection program, without strong assurances that their data
will not be used against them and their communities, given historical examples
of the law enforcement overreach. For example, some may fear that their genetic
material will be accessible by law enforcement, as has been shown through
government use of commercial DNA databases,120 which could result in
threatening consequences for groups who already disproportionately suffer
from the effects of institutional and structural racism in public health and
policing. Undocumented people may fear that their genetic data will be used to
link them to other undocumented people, thus leading to harmful immigration
consequences for themselves and their loved ones.121 They, too, would not be
able to benefit from immunity verification.
119 Kathryn Olivarius, The Dangerous History of Immunoprivilege, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/opinion/coronavirus-immunity-passports.html.
120 Mason Marks & Tiffany Li, DNA Donors Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic
Privacy, STAT (May 30, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-geneticprivacy-nih.
121 Megan Molteni, How DNA Testing at the US-Mexico Border Will Actually Work, WIRED
(May 2, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/how-dna-testing-at-the-us-mexico-border-willactually-work; DNA Tests at Border: DHS to Start Testing to Catch People Posing as Families, CBS
DENVER (May 2, 2019),https://www.wired.com/story/how-dna-testing-at-the-us-mexicoborder-will-actually-work/; https://denver.cbslocal.com/2019/05/02/dna-tests-borderdepartment-homeland-security.
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Using immunity verification as a limiting factor for fundamental rights like
employment, education, and travel could raise constitutional issues as well,
though it is arguable that the government’s compelling interest in protecting
public health in the middle of an active pandemic could outweigh many potential
concerns at least for limited, short term programs. However, as the legal and
regulatory landscape surrounding immunity passports is extremely bare, it would
be difficult for anyone to challenge an incorrect immunity verification and
defend their rights. This difficulty in contestation would be especially
pronounced for those who lack the resources and access to legal support.
Furthermore, it is likely that any programs that develop during pandemic
response will have lasting effects on laws and norms for the future.
Current U.S. discrimination law likely does not prevent the use of immunity
verification programs like immunity passports. The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) protects individuals against
discrimination based on genetic information, but this law is limited to two
sectors: health insurance and employment. GINA prevents health insurers from
denying coverage to individuals based on genetic predisposition and prevents
employers from using genetic information for hiring, firing, promotion, and
related employment decisions.
While it might seem that GINA would protect genetic privacy in the context
of testing and immunity passports, this may not be the case. GINA does not
protect employees from employer surveillance of their genetic information,
potentially including information related to coronavirus testing or immunity
verification. Furthermore, GINA allows employers to request, require, or
purchase genetic information of employees in certain circumstances, including
to comply with certification requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act
and other leave laws and policies, as well as genetic monitoring programs
required by law as well, as well as data from sources that are commercially and
publicly available, and data that an employee voluntarily consents to giving.
While employers are generally prevented from sharing or exposing genetic
information, they are allowed to do so under some circumstances. Additionally,
it is unclear if immunity information would fall under the scope of GINA, as
the information included in an immunity verification passport could potentially
exclude genetic information.
Particularly important is the fact that GINA does not include a cause of
action for genetic discrimination based on disparate impact, a failing Ifeoma
Ajunwa has noted. Ajunwa argues that such a clause should be added to GINA
because:
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(1) ease of access to genetic testing and the insecurity of genetic
information has increased the likelihood of genetic discrimination in
employment;
(2) the addition of a disparate impact clause is in line with the
precedent set by prior employment discrimination laws;
(3) the EEOC has declared that proof of deliberate acquisition of
genetic discrimination is not necessary to establish a violation of GINA,
likewise, proof of intent to discriminate should not be required to
demonstrate that there has been genetic discrimination;
(4) and finally, real world instances of genetic testing have shown
that facially neutral testing may result in racial disparities.122
Adding a disparate-action clause to GINA would protect against most of
the genetic discrimination harms raised by the use of genetic information in the
modern, Big Data era, outside of the limited contexts GINA currently governs.
With the greater scale of testing data, the insecurity of genetic information has
likely increased the likelihood of genetic discrimination, particularly enhanced
by the concept of conditioning employment on immunity verification. Adding
a disparate impact clause would be in line with prior precedent, and past EEOC
declarations remain current. Perhaps most importantly, there is historical
precedent for the racial disparities and discriminatory impact of genetic testing
based on immunity.123
If GINA, the law specifically concerning genetic discrimination, might not
fully protect genetic privacy rights for individuals in the context of immunity
passports, one might wonder if the ADA would serve. The ADA protects
against discrimination in many contexts, including employment. However, here
again, the ADA is insufficient to protect individuals from the discriminatory
harms of enforced immunity-verification programs. The ADA allows employers
to screen out individuals by applying qualification standards, which could
include the requirement “that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”124 Employers are also
allowed to conduct “voluntary medical examinations, including voluntary
medical histories” and “make inquiries into the ability of an employee to
perform job-related functions.”125 In fact, the EEOC in May released guidance
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75, 79 (2016).
Kathryn Olivarius, Immunity, Capital, and Power in Antebellum New Orleans, 124 AM. HIST.
REV. 425 (2019); Kathryn Olivarius, The Dangerous History of Immunoprivilege, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
12, 2020),
https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article/124/2/425/5426380?guestAccessKey=147da8dd81f0-4820-84eb-a766c4c8f74f; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/opinion/coronavirusimmunity-passports.html.
124 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018).
125 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (2018).
122
123
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on interpreting ADA protections in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and
suggested that employers may institute testing of employees for exposure to the
virus.126
To address the harms of genetic discrimination raised by COVID-19 testing
and immunity-verification proposals, we must strengthen protections in GINA
and the ADA. This can come through new genetic-privacy laws,127 through
genetic-privacy provisions in a future national privacy law, or perhaps in an
algorithmic-discrimination or algorithmic-accountability law, as the privacy
harms of new technologies are heavily amplified by the impacts of Big Data,
machine learning, and artificial-intelligence systems today.
C. Contact Tracing
In addition to testing for coronavirus exposure, states have also turned to
contact tracing programs as key parts of pandemic response. Contact tracing in
this context refers to the practice of tracing the contacts of a person identified
as having been exposed to COVID-19, in an effort to halt the further onward
spread of the virus.128
Contact tracing attempts to quickly track and stop the spread of COVID-19
by starting with each person who tests positive for the virus. When a person is
infected with a virus like COVID-19, the infected person is contagious for a
period of time. During this time, the infected person is able to infect others with
the virus. People who come in close physical contact with that person
(“contacts”) thus have a higher risk of infection. Contact tracing attempts to
identify these people quickly, so that the contacts of the infected person can take
steps to also get tested and to practice social isolating, to prevent potentially
infected contacts from spreading the virus further.
1. Contact Tracing Principles
Contact tracing starts with confirming a person has or had a COVID-19
126 What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other
EEO Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitationact-and-other-eeo-laws.
127 But see Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetic Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special
Genetics Legislation?, 79?. WASH. U. L.Q. 669 (2001).Review
128 Selena Simmons-Duffin, How Contact Tracing Works and How It Can Help Reopen the
Country, NPR (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/04/14/833726999/how-contact-tracing-can-help-fight-coronavirus; Contact
Tracing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2017), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-adetail/contact-tracing.
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viral infection. Contact tracing is then implemented to study and stop the further
spread of the virus by alerting the infected person to isolate and by alerting all
people who may have been in contact with the infected person to also monitor
their own symptoms and isolate if needed.
The World Health Organization breaks down contact tracing into three
basic steps: (1) contact identification; (2) contact listing; and (3) contact followup.129 In contact identification, steps are taken to identify all the individuals that
may have been in contact with a person who had the COVID-19 virus during
the period of potential viral transmission. In contact listing, contacts are
informed of their contact status as well as steps they should take to protect their
own health and the health of others. In contact follow-up, contact tracing
program administrators follow up with contacts to monitor for symptoms and
test for signs of infection.
Different types of contact tracing programs have emerged in response to
the novel coronavirus pandemic: human contact tracing and digital contact
tracing. Digital contact tracing has come in two primary conceptions: Bluetoothbased, “decentralized” contact tracing, and centralized contact tracing, often
through cell-phone location data or also through Bluetooth-based data. Each of
these forms of contact tracing programs has its own portfolio of privacy
concerns, and different states have implemented one or more of them. Thus, it
is necessary to discuss each form of contact tracing program in order to attempt
to grasp a holistic overview of the privacy issues raised by contact tracing in the
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Contact tracing is not a new concept but rather an accepted and tested
process used in a variety of epidemiology and public health contexts. However,
the technologies used for digital contact tracing are new and relatively untested
at scale, and these new technologies raise interesting societal issues. The clash
between human and digital contact tracing also brings to light debates regarding
automation and the ability to use machines to replicate or replace human work.
Additionally, the privacy and security problems with digital contact tracing
proposals reflect the changing nature of our society’s relationship with digital
privacy, and the ways in which Big Data and the increasingly imbalanced nature
of the data economy have shaped consumer expectations of privacy.
2. Human Contact Tracing
Governments around the world have implemented mass contact-tracing
programs. For example, the state of Massachusetts created a statewide contactContact Tracing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2017), https://www.who.int/newsroom/q-a-detail/contact-tracing.
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tracing program, hiring 1,000 new contact tracers as part of human contacttracing programs.130 The city of San Francisco launched a program training 150
volunteers to add to the existing contact-tracing programs from their city publichealth department.131
Human contact tracing, or manual contact tracing, refers to contract tracing
done through manual identification of contacts through non-automated means,
as well as contact listing and contact follow-up done through manual, nonautomated means. Traditionally, contact tracing has meant contact tracing as
done manually by humans. However, with this global pandemic in an age of
increasingly digitized services, contact tracing through automated technologies
has emerged as a contender, for better or worse.
a. Human Contact Tracing Data Lifecycle
Human contact tracing describes a process that has been used in
epidemiological and public health contexts prior to but also including the
COVID-19 pandemic. The process is as follows132:
First, a confirmed infected person speaks to a contact tracer, a person
fulfilling a contact tracing role. In this conversation, the contact tracer asks
questions of the infected person, with an eye toward identifying contacts. These
conversations often take place in a one-on-one setting over the phone. For
example, a contact tracer from a state health department could call a person who
tested positive of COVID-19 and ask for a list of everyone the infected person
had come into contact with in the last 2 weeks.
Contact tracers can be healthcare professionals, public health workers, or
dedicated contact tracing staff. In Massachusetts, which launched a robust
human contact tracing program, this identification stage is done through oneon-one calls between the infected person and a contact tracer (hired by the state
program, in partnership with a medical nonprofit, Partners in Health).133 Contact
Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contacttracing.html.
131 Kristen Sze, EXCLUSIVE: San Francisco Launches Initiative to Trace Every Single COVID19 Case and Contact, ABC7 NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://abc7news.com/san-francisco-contacttracing-coronavirus-tracnig-bay-area-lockdown-shelter-in-place/6090943.
132 Selena Simmons-Duffin, How Contact Tracing Works and How It Can Help Reopen the
Country, NPR (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/04/14/833726999/how-contact-tracing-can-help-fight-coronavirus.
133 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contacttracing.html.
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tracers receive information about infected persons through state databases that
store results of coronavirus tests. The contact tracer then calls the infected
person by phone and creates a list of all people the person had been in contact
with in the 48 hours before the person’s symptoms began.
Second, contact tracers will call or otherwise notify all contacts that they
were exposed to someone who tested positive of COVID-19, informing these
contacts of their risks as well as how to protect themselves and others from the
virus and its effects. Contact tracers may suggest that contacts perform such
actions as monitoring their own symptoms, self-quarantining, or trying to get
their own tests for viral infection. In the Massachusetts contact tracing program,
contact tracers attempt to call each contact, calling three times in succession “to
signal the call’s importance.”134 If the contact picks up the phone, the contact
tracer then informs them that they may have been expose to the virus, walks
them through common symptoms and quarantine recommendations, and
explains where they can get further help if needed. These conversations can take
thirty to forty minutes.135
In an ongoing final stage of the process, contact tracers follow up with
contacts to monitor symptoms and spread of the virus. This can be done
informally or through rigorously monitored programs. In South Korea,136 for
example, contact tracers follow up with contacts on a routine basis and request
or mandate that contacts track and submit their symptoms to a government
database.
Human contact tracing has its benefits and drawbacks, when compared to
digital contact tracing programs. Finding out that you may have been exposed
to the virus can be a frightening or worrying experience, and it can be helpful to
have a human there to guide that first conveying of information. Public-health
officials, taking lessons from contact tracing sexually transmitted infections such
as HIV, have learned “to talk to people in a way that’s not stigmatizing and will
encourage people to get on board with the request to self-isolate or share their
contacts,” according to Jeff Engel, senior advisor for COVID-19 to the Council

134 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contacttracing.html.
135 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contacttracing.html.
136 Max S. Kim, South Korea is Watching Quarantined Citizens with a Smartphone App, MIT
TECH. REV. (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/06/905459/coronavirus-south-koreasmartphone-app-quarantine.
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of State and Territorial Epidemiologists.137 It is likely that an automated process
cannot duplicate the social and emotional benefits of human contact tracing,
perhaps similar to the same issues we see with the use of care robots in times of
crisis.
It is difficult to calculate the social benefit of having human contact in the
contact tracing process. However, it is possible to calculate the financial costs
of contact tracing programs, which some governments may find too
expensive.138 On the other hand, hiring unemployed individuals to serve as
contact tracers could create an economic stimulus in a time when
unemployment is high. Perhaps the greatest flaw of the human contact-tracing
programs isn’t the cost but the difficulty of scaling a personal, one-to-one
approach to a global pandemic.
b. Human Contact Tracing’s Privacy Impact
For a holistic analysis of the privacy issues related to human contact tracing,
we can start once again with the types of data that are collected and processed,
as well as the different actors involved with contact tracing.
Contact tracers receive information about the infected person to facilitate
the contact identification stage (e.g., phone interviews). This information can
include name, phone number, address, as well as health information (at the very
least, a positive COVID-19 test result). During the identification conversations,
infected persons may share the names and contact information of potential
contacts, as well as other information, including information about the infected
person’s activities and locations in the days prior to the start of their symptoms.
As these are phone calls between two potentially unpredictable human beings,
any number of other types of information could be shared in the identification
stage. Similarly, in the contact listing stage, which consists of conversations with
contacts, many types of data may be shared—including identifying information
as well as others.
Some of the information collected during human contact tracing can include
health information, as defined in HIPAA and state laws. Contact tracers may be
acting on behalf of entities that would be governed under HIPAA, including
healthcare providers, which could mean that transmission of health information
137 Selena Simmons-Duffin, How Contact Tracing Works and How It Can Help Reopen the
Country, NPR (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/04/14/833726999/how-contact-tracing-can-help-fight-coronavirus.
138 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contacttracing.html.
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would have to comply with HIPAA and similar regulations. Contact tracers may
also be acting through state and municipal public-health departments, which
would not necessarily be covered entities that have to comply with HIPAA
restrictions on health information. However, most of the entities conducting
COVID-19 tests would likely qualify as HIPAA covered entities; thus,
organizations receiving health information would likely have to at least comply
with the requirements for business associates under HIPAA. Laws like GINA
and the 21st Century Cures Act protect the confidentiality of patient health
information used for federally-funded research.
There are some risks to privacy and security that come with human contacttracing programs, particularly during a pandemic in which many would work
from home. The more people have access to any data (including health
information), the more risk there is that data may be exposed, even
inadvertently. As it is likely many contact tracers may work remotely, it may be
difficult to monitor whether contact tracers are practicing strong cybersecurity
hygiene in protecting information. For example, it is difficult to know if any
contact tracers are separately recording or writing down information from
conversations, or if there are other people in the room while the contact tracer
is working. It is possible that digital contact-tracing programs could have less of
this form of distributed risk, as well as less room for human error contributing
to privacy and security risks. There are a number of data breach disclosure laws
across states that may come into play if information were to be exposed.
3. Digital Contact Tracing
In the COVID-19 pandemic, digital contact tracing has emerged as a publichealth response tool, for perhaps the first time on such a large national and
global scale.139 In contrast to human contact tracing, digital contact tracing relies
on digital, often automated, “contact tracing apps” that aid in identifying
potential contacts of infected individuals. Digital contact tracing can also include
digital, sometimes app-based, means of informing contacts of their potential
exposure and the associated risks and recommendations. The follow-up
capabilities of digital contact tracing programs are various and can include
simple email reminders to required enrollment in apps that track symptoms.
Two primary forms of digital contact tracing have become popular:140 first,
139 Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tate Ryan-Mosley & Bobbie Johnson, A Flood of Coronavirus
Apps Are Tracking Us. Now It’s Timei to Keep Track of Them.. MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020),
Review.https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covidtracing-tracker.
140 Cristina Criddle & Leo Kelion, Coronavirus Contact-Tracingcontact-tracing: World Split Between
Two Types of App, BBC (May 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52355028.
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a centralized approach, often utilizing cell-phone location data; second, a
decentralized approach, often using a short-range Bluetooth standard. Both
types of digital contact-tracing programs have their benefits and drawbacks, not
the least of which relate to privacy impacts of individuals and groups.
a. Decentralized Digital Contact Tracing
While each proposed digital contact-tracing application is different,
generally, decentralized contact-tracing apps use short-range Bluetooth
technology to determine proximity between individuals at certain points in time.
The concept involves individuals (ideally a high percentage141 of the populace)
downloading the app. Some of these apps would run on background, and some
would need to be active on a person’s mobile device to be useful. If a person
tests positive for COVID-19, that person would update their status with the app
(or, in some cases, another entity could update the app). The decentralized
digital contact-tracing apps would then utilize “a record of anonymous key
codes exchanged between phones” to determine which other individuals (who
had the app installed or active) had been in proximity with the infected person
during the contagious period.142
Decentralized contact-tracing apps have been called “privacy-preserving.”143
These privacy-preserving proposals include the Decentralized PrivacyPreserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) project,144 the East Coast145 PACT,146 the

141 Digital Contact Tracing Can Slow or Even Stop Coronavirus Transmission and Ease Us Out of
Lockdown, OXFORD (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16digital-contact-tracing-can-slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-oflockdown.
142 Kylie Foy, Bluetooth Signals From Your Smartphone Could Automate Covid-19 Contact Tracing While
Preserving Privacy, MIT NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://news.mit.edu/2020/bluetooth-covid-19contact-tracing-0409.
143 For example, the ACLU released a white paper on digital contact tracing that
specifically noted DP-3T, East Coast PACT, and TCN as privacy-preserving proposals. Daniel
Kahn Gillmor, Principles for Technology-Assisted Contact-Tracing, AM. C.L. UNION (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.aclu.org/report/aclu-white-paper-principles-technology-assisted-contact-tracing.
144 Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing, GITHUB, https://github.com/DP-3T.
145 Informal differentiation suggested by the team behind the “East Coast PACT,” upon
noting the accidental similarity in acronym. See Ronald L. Rivest et al., The PACT Protocol
Specification, PACT (Apr. 8, 2020), https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ThePACT-protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf.
146 PACT: PRIVATE AUTOMATED CONTACT TRACING, https://pact.mit.edu; Ronald L.
Rivest et al., PACT: Private Automated Contact Tracing (Apr. 7, 2020), https://pact.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/MIT-PACT-ONEPAGER-2020-04-07-B.pdf; Ronald L. Rivest et
al., The PACT Protocol Specification, PACT (Apr. 8, 2020), https://pact.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf.
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West Coast PACT,147 and TCN.148 European states and researchers have
supported the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPPPT).149 These decentralized digital contact-tracing apps all have similarities in
their protocol design.150 Some researchers involved with these apps have
suggested solutions for increasing interoperability, allowing solutions to develop
in parallel and potentially exchange information (e.g., users of multiple apps
would be pinged if they were found to have been in proximity with an infected
person), aiding widespread adoption and use.151
Perhaps the leading commercial proposal is an approach developed by
Apple and Google in partnership.152 Through the joint effort, Apple and Google
launched a “comprehensive solution that includes application programming
interfaces (APIs) and operating system-level technology to assist in enabling
contact tracing.”153 An API is a computer-programing interface that defines
interactions between software components or applications, allowing
applications to call and request data. The Apple and Google proposal performs
a different function than the other decentralized digital contact-tracing
proposals, in that it provides an API that can be used to allow communication
between other applications, as opposed to releasing an application that can stand
on its own. Google and Apple specify this as an “Exposure Notification
system,” rather than a contact-tracing application,154 perhaps for that reason.
Some nations and states have deployed contact tracing apps. However, these
apps have not reached a high percentage of the population in most regions
where the apps have launched. For example, as of July 2020, only 14.4% of the
147 Justin Chan et al., PACT: Privacy-Sensitive Protocols and Mechanisms for Mobile
Contact Tracing (May 7, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.03544.pdf.
148 TCN COALITION, https://tcn-coalition.org.
149 PAN-EUROPEAN PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROXIMITY TRACING, https://www.pepppt.org.
150 Ronald L. Rivest et al., The PACT Protocol Specification, PACT (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocol-specification-ver0.1.pdf.
151 Ellie Daw et al., Contact Tracing Interoperability Recommendations, TCN COALITION (May 1,
2020),
https://tcncoalition.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/tcncoalition_interoperability_recommenda
tions_whitepaper.pdf.
152 Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology, GOOGLE (Apr. 10,
2020), https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/apple-and-googlepartner-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology.
153 Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology, GOOGLE (Apr. 10,
2020), https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/apple-and-googlepartner-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology.
154 Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing.
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population in Germany downloaded the state-developed “Corona-Warn-App,”
and only 4% of the population in France have downloaded the similar
“StopCovid” app.155 It appears likely that digital contact tracing will not be a
large factor in solving the coronavirus pandemic. However, with the launch of
these apps, it is likely that the next major epidemic will involve digital contact
tracing. Thus, it is important to understand how these apps function in this
crisis, to better prepare for the next one.
b. Centralized Digital Contact Tracing
Centralized digital contact-tracing apps diverge from decentralized apps in
relying on a central database or central authority for the contact-tracing data and
process.156 For example, Singapore’s Trace Together app collects all data from
individual devices in a national-government database157.
Centralized contact-tracing app proposals have involved a variety of data
sources, primarily Bluetooth data and cell-phone location data. For example, a
Bluetooth-based decentralized app would infer proximity through anonymous
key exchange device-to-device; but a Bluetooth-based centralized app could
infer proximity through keys stored on a central database, with data collected
from each device and results pushed back to devices.
The chief privacy concern with centralized contact tracing is that these
programs would enable governments to collect and use data as part of largescale surveillance, with few limits on what governments could do with the
data.158 With centralized digital contact tracing, a central authority has control
over all data that is collected, used, shared, and stored. There are few protections
against misuse of data collected by these apps. Thus, the privacy of users of
centralized contact-tracing apps depends on the trustworthiness of the central
authority.
However, as Helen Nissenbaum noted on Twitter, “there’s no loss of
privacy as long as data is appropriately channeled. Trade off language sets up
false dilemmas; we can enjoy gains without privacy casualties.”159 Using
155 Gabriel Geiger, Europeans Aren’t Really Using COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, VICE (July
21, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/akzne5/europeans-arent-really-using-covid19-contact-tracing-apps.
156 Baobao Zhang et al., Americans’ Perceptions of Privacy and Surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic,
OSF PREPRINTS (May 13, 2020), osf.io/9wz3y.
157 Baobao Zhang et al., Americans’ Perceptions of Privacy and Surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic,
OSF PREPRINTS (May 13, 2020), osf.io/9wz3y.
158 Susan Landau, Christy E. Lopez & Laura Moy, The Importance of Equity in Contact Tracing,
LAWFARE (May 1, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/importance-equity-contact-tracing.
159 Helen Nissenbaum (@HNissenbaum), TWITTER (May 13, 2020, 3:13 PM),
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Nissenbaum’s influential contextual integrity framework,160 we can certainly
envision a scenario in which privacy rights are protected for the specific contexts
raised by the contact-tracing process. In fact, some have argued that centralized
contact-tracing apps may be more secure or privacy-protective, in that one
central source stores all private information, making it potentially easier to
govern the flows of data.
c. Digital Contact Tracing’s Privacy Impact
One issue with digital contact tracing apps, whether decentralized or
centralized, is that they require a high percentage of the population to download
and use the apps in order for the apps to actually be effective in tracing contacts
and stopping or slowing the spread of disease.161 However, early research
surveying public perception on various digital contact-tracing apps has revealed
mixed results,162 suggesting that it may be difficult to convince some populations
(e.g., certain nations or regions) to adopt the apps at a high enough rate to be
efficacious. Indeed, as of July 2020, few if any nations that have rolled out
voluntary apps have seen app adoption at rates necessary for effective contact

https://twitter.com/HNissenbaum/status/1260649364407545856.
160 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009).
161 Digital Contact Tracing Can Slow or Even Stop Coronavirus Transmission and Ease Us Out of
Lockdown, U. OXFORD (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16digital-contact-tracing-can-slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-oflockdown.
162 See, e.g., Monica Anderson & Brooke Auxier, Most Americans Don’t Think Cellphone Tracking
Will Help Limit COVID-19, Are Divided on Whether It’s Acceptable, PEW RES. (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/16/most-americans-dont-think-cellphonetracking-will-help-limit-covid-19-are-divided-on-whether-its-acceptable; Eszter Hargittai et al.,
Covid-19 Study on Digital Media and the Coronavirus Pandemic, WEB USE PROJECT,
http://webuse.org/covid; Luke Milsom et al., Survey of Acceptability of App-Based Contact Tracing
in the UK, US, France, Germany and Italy, OSF (May 12, 2020), osf.io/7vgq9; Baobao Zhang et
al., Americans’ Perceptions of Privacy and Surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic, OSF PREPRINTS
(May 13, 2020), See, e.g., osf.io/9wz3y; Lucy Simko et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing and
Privacy: Studying Opinion and Preferences (May 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://seclab.cs.washington.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/contact-tracing-userprivacy.pdfhttps://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/16/most-americans-dont-thinkcellphone-tracking-will-help-limit-covid-19-are-divided-on-whether-itsacceptable/;acceptabilityapp-based contact tracing. For a publicly accessible, updated list of
studies on perceptions of privacy and contact-tracing apps, see Baobao Zhang, COVID-19
Contact Tracing Apps Public Opinion Studies, NOTION,:
https://www.notion.so/34e11bad13e34c558f5aa4a4975f6df0?v=c36d57c8ae5640a49a00b91d
79a4cf9c.
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tracing.163 Some nations, like India,164 have gotten around this by mandating
citizens download and use the app.
Several scholars and advocates have expressed concerns about the privacy
and civil-liberties harms contact-tracing apps might cause. Woodrow Hartzog
noted that, although the Google and Apple proposal might be well-meaning, it
would be difficult for the companies to police the use of app operators to ensure
compliance.165 (This is not far-fetched. One need only look at the noncompliance of app developers on the Google Play store or Apple app store,
which has been a constant issue for many app platforms.166) Hartzog argues it
would be simple for governments to abuse even the most privacy-preserving
contact-tracing apps and, crucially, “this technology, once deployed, will not be
‘rolled back.’”167
Susan Landau et al. have also argued that contact-tracing apps may also
create a false sense of security, leading some to recklessly put themselves at
greater risk of exposure while relying on a potentially ineffective app.168 Contacttracing apps also raise equity concerns, as highlighted by Laundau et al.,
generating more false positives, with worse consequences.169 Additionally, if data
collected through these apps is eventually used for other purposes, including law
enforcement, this could have worse impact on some populations.170 Simko et al.
have noted a number of privacy harms, including the potential for malicious
actors to create intentional false positives, with negative consequences for
people or businesses.171
163
Gabriel Geiger, Europeans Aren’t Really Using COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, VICE
(July 21, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/akzne5/europeans-arent-really-usingcovid-19-contact-tracing-apps.
164 Patrick Howell O’Neill, India Is Forcing People to Use Its Covid App, Unlike Any Other
Democracy, MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1001360/india-aarogya-setu-covid-appmandatory.
165 Opinion, Woodrow Hartzog, Op-Ed: Coronavirus Tracing Apps Are Coming. Here’s How
They Could Reshape Surveillance as We Know It, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-05-12/coronavirus-tracing-app-apple-google.
166 For example, the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal was caused by a rogue
third-party app exceeding the terms.
167 Opinion, Woodrow Hartzog, Op-Ed: Coronavirus Tracing Apps Are Coming. Here’s How
They Could Reshape Surveillance as We Know It, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-05-12/coronavirus-tracing-app-apple-google.
168 Susan Landau, Christy E. Lopez & Laura Moy, The Importance of Equity in Contact Tracing,
LAWFARE (May 1, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/importance-equity-contact-tracing.
169 Susan Landau, Christy E. Lopez & Laura Moy, The Importance of Equity in Contact Tracing,
LAWFARE (May 1, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/importance-equity-contact-tracing.
170 Susan Landau, Christy E. Lopez & Laura Moy, The Importance of Equity in Contact Tracing,
LAWFARE (May 1, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/importance-equity-contact-tracing
171 Lucy Simko et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Privacy: Studying Opinion and
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4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions for Contact-Tracing Programs
First, we must accept that we are wading in uncharted waters with digital
contact-tracing applications launched at national or global scale. It is likely that
we will not know what was the best solution until much later, with the precise
view that only hindsight can provide. With that in mind, because the need is so
dire, and the risks of not pushing forth with a full-fledged approach are
hundreds of thousands to millions of deaths, there is no choice but to throw
everything at the problem and see what sticks.172 Digital contact-tracing
applications will not be enough (likely due to low user adoption), but they can
theoretically help supplement or inform human contact tracing. If nothing else,
it is helpful to evaluate their use in this pandemic to better prepare for the next
global health crisis.
If we are to use or even try digital contact tracing, it is key that policymakers
and other authorities understand the technical details of these apps, particularly
the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized digital contact-tracing
proposals. This will require consultation with technical experts, as the relative
dearth of technical experts embedded in government and policymaking roles is
a longstanding problem.
None of these applications can be perfectly precise and without flaws,
including false positives (e.g., people whose devices were in close Bluetooth
proximity but who were physically not with their devices, for example173) and
false negatives174 (e.g., any single person not using the app). However, it appears
that decentralized apps are likely the better choice, both because they are more
privacy-preserving on a technical level and also because, due to the lack of
consumer faith in government privacy protection, they are the better choice in
terms of privacy perception and likely user adoption.
Governments and other actors seeking to launch digital contact-tracing
programs should encourage the use of decentralized contact-tracing apps that
are interoperable at some level. Additionally, governments should pass laws that
address the use of information collected during the contact-tracing process,
including during human contact tracing, in order to protect the privacy of
Preferences (May 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), .https://seclab.cs.washington.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/contact-tracing-user-privacy.pdf.
172 Tiffany C. Li, Give All My Data to Google and the CDC, SLATE (Apr. 6, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/04/google-cdc-data-privacy-covid19.html.
173 Ross Anderson, Contact Tracing in the Real World, LIGHT BLUE TOUCHPAPER (Apr. 12,
2020), https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2020/04/12/contact-tracing-in-the-real-world.
174 Susan Landau, Looking Beyond Contact Tracing to Stop the Spread, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2020,
8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/looking-beyond-contact-tracing-stop-spread.
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individuals. At time of writing, a number of proposals have been raised in the
United States. Regulatory agencies can also release guidance on privacy
protections, both regarding enforceable mechanisms and best practices for
contact-tracing programs. Similarly, those who build, implement, and run
contact-tracing programs should also create and agree to industry standards, in
line with what researchers have been doing with interoperability standards for
decentralized contact-tracing applications. Publicizing privacy protections may
aid in restoring user trust, which may then help increase use of contact-tracing
programs, digital or not.
D. Novel Technologies in Healthcare
The pandemic has already changed healthcare, with effects that may last long
after the world recovers. For example, there has been great growth in
telemedicine and telehealth services, as many healthcare providers have closed
their offices or limited in-person visits.175 The pandemic has brought some
medical uses of technology to the forefront, including telehealth and
telemedicine, use of medical AI in diagnostics and research, and the use of
patient-facing devices and care robots in healthcare settings.
At the same time, the unique dimensions of the pandemic have changed the
use of technology in medicine. The public-health emergency has created the
sudden need for a large medical and healthcare workforce, both in direct
response to patients in relation to COVID-19 and associated medical issues, as
well as to replace healthcare workers who may be indisposed due to exposure
to the virus or becoming ill themselves. The extremely contagious nature of the
virus has also made it difficult to treat patients, necessitating a limitation on
physical contact between patients and healthcare professionals as well as the
friends and family who would otherwise be visiting. Additionally, different
groups of people may be facing disparate health struggles, including exacerbated
issues of bias in medical care.176
1. Telehealth and Telemedicine
Two unique factors of this pandemic have led to a rise in telehealth,
telemedicine, and teletherapy services. First, the novel coronavirus is highly
Kathleen T. Jordan, An Unexpected Benefit of the Pandemic: The Doctor Will Virtually See You
Now, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2020, 9:17 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/14/telemedicine-virtual-healthcoronavirus.
176 John Eligon & Audra D. S. Burch, Questions of Bias in Covid-19 Treatment Add to the
Mourning for Black Families, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/us/coronavirus-african-americans-bias.html.
175
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contagious, necessitating social distancing. Traditional physical locations where
healthcare is provided have been shut down, and in-person house calls raise
concerns regarding contagion as well. Second, the failures in the health systems
of many nations in being able to meet medical needs of both COVID-19
sufferers and others during this time have led to a need for more medical
services. Thus, in a time when more medical services are needed, and yet medical
service providers cannot physically be near patients, telehealth has become an
important part of healthcare across the world.
Regulators have recognized this need, relaxing some HIPAA restrictions to
allow for more medical providers to more easily offer telehealth services to
patients in need.177 It is possible that these relaxations of HIPAA may pave the
way for future loosening of HIPAA and related restrictions on transmission and
storage of health information. Telehealth has been beneficial to many,
improving access to healthcare for people in rural areas,178 low-income
populations, disabled people, and more. However, the increased use of
telehealth may disadvantage people without access to stable or strong internet
or computer or mobile devices.
What is interesting is not telehealth itself, or HIPAA, but rather the speed
at which HHS was willing to bend HIPAA rules in a state of public-health
emergency. This speaks to the malleability of HIPPA protections—and healthprivacy protections in the United States generally. While the pandemic may have
been a good reason to loosen these regulations, one must wonder if the
regulations so easily loosened should be restructured overall to better fit future
177 COVID-19 & HIPAA Bulletin: Limited Waiver of HIPAA Sanctions and Penalties During a
Nationwide Public
Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-and-covid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin508.pdf; Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the
COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 17,
2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergencypreparedness/notification-enforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html; Office of Civil
Rights, COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to Law Enforcement, Paramedics, Other First Responders
and Public Health Authorities, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf; Office
of Civil Rights, Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. DEPT.
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocrbulletin-3-28-20.pdf; Office of Civil Rights, FAQs on Telehealth and HIPAA During the COVID19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf.HHS
Limited HIPAA Waiver
178 Gabby Galvin, Expanded Telehealth Has Provided a Boost for Rural America. Will It Last?,
U.S. NEWS (May 7, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiestcommunities/articles/2020-05-07/telehealth-a-boost-for-rural-america-during-coronaviruspandemic.
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crises. Perhaps, health-privacy regulations should allow for emergency response
and for technological innovation when needed, while still protecting patient
privacy. If the current regulatory scheme for health privacy does not adequately
protect Americans in a public-health crisis, the law must resolve this
discrepancy.
2. Medical AI for Research, Diagnostics, and Triage
Artificial intelligence and machine-learning tools have also been key
components of the medical and scientific response to the pandemic. Artificial
intelligence describes any form of machine intelligence designed to mimic the
functionality of human intelligence. Machine learning is a process by which a
machine is fed a quantity of data, from which it extrapolates certain predictions
based on that data.179
AI is being used in medical research, to search for treatments and vaccines
for the novel coronavirus. For example, researchers have adapted or
implemented existing AI technology for use in medical triage for COVID-19
patients. Researchers in China and the United States reportedly developed an
AI-backed tool to predict which newly infected patients would likely later
develop acute respiratory disease syndrome (ARDS), a severe lung disease that
kills fifty percent of patients. The idea was that this tool could then be used by
hospitals running low on resources to triage their patients—e.g., giving
ventilators to patients less likely to develop ARDS (and thus more likely to
survive the infection).180 Another AI system designed to help hospitals triage
patients is eCART, a system used by the University of Chicago Medical Center,
to predict which patients will have worse medical outcomes (e.g., which patients
will need intubations).181 A Stanford team lead by Ron Li is also evaluating an
automated “Deterioration Index” to identify patients whose medical conditions
will likely deteriorate.182
These AI-enabled tools may be useful in aiding medical staff, potentially
saving time and resources. They may also lift some of the burdens from
physicians and other healthcare workers who would otherwise have to make
MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE (2018).)
AI Tool Predicts Which Coronavirus Patients Get Deadly ‘Wet Lung,’ YAHOO! NEWS (Mar.
30, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/ai-tool-predicts-coronavirus-patients-deadly-wet-lung184124238.html.
181 Eliza Strickland, AI Can Help Hospitals Triage COVID-19 Patients, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Apr. 17, 2020), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/artificial-intelligence/medical-ai/aican-help-hospitals-triage-covid19-patients.
182 Eliza Strickland, AI Can Help Hospitals Triage COVID-19 Patients, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Apr. 17, 2020), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/artificial-intelligence/medical-ai/aican-help-hospitals-triage-covid19-patients.
179
180
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difficult decisions on their own that would take time from their other clinical
duties. One of the most tragic phenomena of this pandemic has been that the
lack of medical resources has pushed doctors to triage lifesaving equipment,
making decisions on who lives or dies.183 It is possible that having an AI-enabled
tool to back up a doctor’s decision could alleviate some of the burden of this
ethical quagmire. Medical AI tools may be able to save time and resources for
health professionals, which could mean saving lives when in a public-health
crisis. However, the use of AI in medical triage is fraught with ethical issues,
including concerns raised by disability advocates that people with disabilities
may be at higher risk of death due to triage plans prioritizing people without
disabilities.184
AI systems should be designed with privacy interests in mind. For example,
if patient data is used to train a machine learning algorithm on predicting which
patients may develop which symptoms, it is necessary that the patient data is
deidentified or collected in a non-identifiable manner. The use of patient data,
potentially including photographs (e.g., X-ray scans of lungs to analyze COVIDrelated damage185), also comes with privacy risks. Re-identification of data is
always a risk, as well as misuse of patient data. Patients may not realize how their
data is used, and, while proper informed consent is necessary before collecting
patient data for use in these systems, it may be difficult to gain adequate consent
for difficult-to-understand tools and data usage, particularly in emergency
settings. While regulations like the 21st Century Cures Act may protect patient
information used in federal research, some AI systems are built by private
institutions,186 with fewer regulations on the collection and use of data.
Additionally, the critical emergency nature of an active global pandemic may
Opinion, John Chisolm, Doctors Will Have to Choose Who Gets Life-Saving Treatment. Here’s
How We’ll Do It, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020, 9:08 AM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/01/doctors-choose-life-savingtreatment-ethical-rules; Opinion, Ezekiel J. Emanuel, James Phillips & Govind Persad, How the
Coronavirus May Force Doctors to Decide Who Can Live and Who Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/opinion/coronavirus-hospital-shortage.html; Yascha
Mounk, The Extraordinary Decisions Facing Italian Doctors, ATLANTIC (Mar. 11,
2020),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/opinion/coronavirus-hospital-shortage.html;
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/who-gets-hospital-bed/607807.
184 Mike Baker, Whose Life is Worth Saving? In Washington State, People With Disabilities Are
Afraid They Won’t Make the Cut, NY TIMES (March 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/coronavirus-washington-triage-disabledhandicapped.html.
185 Scott Lyon, AI tool gives doctors a new look at lungs while treating COVID-19, PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY (May 21, 2020), https://www.princeton.edu/news/2020/05/21/ai-tool-givesdoctors-new-look-lungs-treating-covid-19
186 See, e.g., Baidu, How Baidu Is Bringing AI to the Fight Against Coronavirus, MIT TECH. REV.
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/11/905366/how-baidu-isbringing-ai-to-the-fight-against-coronavirus.
183
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necessitate a relaxing of some privacy-based restrictions on use of data,
including in AI systems.
These AI-based tools are not without their drawbacks. Many scholars have
highlighted problems with bias187 that creep into the design and implementation
of many AI systems. Medical AI systems also suffer from this problem,188 and
the consequences can be literal life or death for patients.189 While it is
understandable that healthcare providers in the middle of a public-health
emergency turn to any tools that can help them maximize their time and
resources and help save more lives, it is troubling that some of these tools may
not have been designed with fairness and equality in mind.
Privacy is an important dimension of the algorithmic-discrimination
problem. Some privacy-protective measures may actually make algorithmic
discrimination worse. For example, by stripping data of some identifying
characteristics (like race, gender, and so on), system designers may unknowingly
use biased data or data that is not reflective of their target population. This may
also make it more difficult to audit the algorithms afterward, to analyze if
algorithmic discrimination occurred. It is also possible that privacy laws and
regulations may limit the data available to researchers and designers of AI
systems.
Algorithmic discrimination can happen at different points in an AI systems,
including in the designed goals of the system, the selection of training data, the
choice of parameters, and more.190 For example, an AI-based tool that predicts
the likelihood a COVID-19 patient will survive intubation could rely on past
data of patients that have had the virus and either did end up surviving
See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671 (2016); Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in
Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1 (2018); Danielle Keats
Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH.
WASH.L. REV. REV.1, 4 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process:
Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REVREV. 93, 101 (2014).)
188 Danton S. Char, Nigam H. Shah & David Magnus, Implementing Machine Learning in
Health Care—Addressing Ethical Challenges, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981 (2018); W., William
Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 66 (2019); Carolyn
Y. Johnson, Racial Bias in a Medical Algorithm Favors White Patients Over Sicker Black Patients,
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 2:00 PM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/10/24/racial-bias-medical-algorithm-favorswhite-patients-over-sicker-black-patients.
189Gina Kolata, Many Medical Decision Tools Disadvantage Black Patients, NY TIMES (June 17,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/health/many-medical-decision-toolsdisadvantage-black-patients.html.
190 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671 (2016); Joshua A. Kroll et al.,. Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017)..
187
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intubation or didn’t. However, the data set of patient outcomes might not
include confounding factors, including race, gender, socioeconomic class, and
more. The dataset may reflect biases.
For example, consider a hospital that decides to use an AI triage system that
predicts patient survival based on a data set of past patients and intubation
survival rates. The hospital uses this system to decide which patients are given
priority when allocating ventilators. A system based on past survival data may
seem unbiased and neutral. However, there are a number of ways bias could
creep in. Perhaps patients living in low-income areas tended to also suffer from
lack of access to consistent healthcare and nutrition, leading to worse health
outcomes when hospitalized. The predictive algorithm, then, might predict
outcomes that reflect those biases, predicting that low-income patients would
be less likely to survive intubation. This would create what many would agree
would be a discriminatory outcome: the AI tool would suggest
disproportionately that low-income patients should not be prioritized. A
hospital using this system would then unintentionally prioritize wealthier
patients, leading to a death disparity.
Of course, human healthcare providers may also not be without their own
biases. Studies have shown that some groups suffer worse outcomes than
others, due possibly to the bias of healthcare workers.191 For example, a review
of pain management in hospitals found that Black and Hispanic patients were
less likely to receive pain-relieving analgesia for the management of acute pain,
implying that healthcare providers had made decisions based on patients’ race
and not on the patients’ actual need for pain relief.192 Bias may also be playing a
role in creating disproportionate medical consequences for some communities
in the pandemic.193
The law has not comprehensively addressed the risks of medical AI.194 While
191 See, e.g., DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN HEALTHCARE (2015); Leonard E. Egede, Race, Ethnicity, Culture,
and Disparities in Health Care, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 667
(2006).https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1924616/;
192 Paulyne Lee et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Management of Acute Pain in US
Emergency Departments: Meta-Analysis and Systematic Review, 37 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 1770
(2019).
193 Opinion, Ben Crump, For Black Americans, Bias Seen in Coronavirus Response Is Continuation
of Injustice, USA TODAY (Apr. 9, 2020, 6:39 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/us/coronavirus-african-americans-bias.html;
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2020/04/09/black-americanscoronavirus-response-continuation-injustice/5120999002; John Eligon & Audra D. S. Burch,
Questions of Bias in Covid-19 Treatment Add to the Mourning for Black Families, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/us/coronavirus-african-americans-bias.html.
194 Jane R. Yakowitz Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 UC DAVIS L.Law REV. 383 (2017); Charlotte
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medical AI tools can be useful in a public-health emergency like the coronavirus
pandemic, the law must balance protection of patient privacy and algorithmic
rights versus the need for researchers and healthcare providers to act and
innovate nimbly in times of crisis.
3. Healthcare Robots
One of the myriad difficulties of healthcare in the middle of a highly
contagious viral epidemic is the need to isolate patients from each other, from
healthcare professionals, and from their family and friends. Some hospitals have
also turned to robots195 to assist, especially where it would be difficult or costly
to have humans performing the same tasks.196 For example, robots have been
used in hospitals around the world to remotely take temperature readings,197 a
task that would otherwise require a human healthcare provider to get in close
physical proximity to the patient. While the coronavirus pandemic created new
needs for robots deployed in healthcare settings, robots have been frequently
deployed in other disaster and emergency settings.198 Robots can be helpful in
emergency situations where a human presence would be dangerous or
inefficient, including in healthcare emergencies where human proximity is a
Tschider, Deus ex Machina: Regulating Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence for Patients of the Future, 5
SAVANNAH L. REV. 177 (2018).
195 Mary Meisenzahl, An Indian Hospital Is Using Robots with Thermal Cameras to Screen
Coronavirus Patients—Here’s How They Work, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2020, 7:45 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/india-coronavirus-robot-uses-thermal-camera-to-taketemperature-2020-5; Robin R. Murphy et al., Robots Are Playing Many Roles in the Coronavirus
Crisis—And Offering Lessons for Future Disasters, CONVERSATION (Apr. 22, 2020, 7:46 AM EDT),
https://theconversation.com/robots-are-playing-many-roles-in-the-coronavirus-crisis-andoffering-lessons-for-future-disasters-135527; Cat Wise, How Robots and Other Tech Can Make the
Fight Against Coronavirus Safer, PBS (May 4, 2020),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-robots-and-other-tech-can-make-the-fightagainst-coronavirus-safer.
196 Robin R. Murphy et al., Robots Are Playing Many Roles in the Coronavirus Crisis—And
Offering Lessons for Future Disasters, CONVERSATION (Apr. 22, 2020, 7:46 AM EDT),
https://theconversation.com/robots-are-playing-many-roles-in-the-coronavirus-crisis-andoffering-lessons-for-future-disasters-135527 (“One important lesson is that during a disaster
robots do not replace people. They either perform tasks that a person could not do or do
safely, or take on tasks that free up responders to handle the increased workload.”).
197 Mary Meisenzahl, An Indian Hospital Is Using Robots with Thermal Cameras to Screen
Coronavirus Patients—Here’s How They Work, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2020, 7:45 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/india-coronavirus-robot-uses-thermal-camera-to-taketemperature-2020-5; SNUH Uses New Methods to Prevent COVID-19 Infection, SNUH (Mar. 26,
2020).; http://www.snuh.org/global/en/about/newsView.do?bbs_no=5113.
198 ROBIN R. MURPHY, DISASTER ROBOTICS (2014); International Cooperation in Deploying
Robots for Disasters: Lessons for the Future from the Great East Japan Earthquake, 32 J. ROBOTICS
SOC’Y JAPAN 104 (2014)https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jrsj/32/2/32_32_104/_article;
Robin R. Murphy et al., Mobile Robots in Mine Rescue and Recovery, 16 IEEE ROBOTICS &
AUTOMATION MAG. 91 (2009).
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potential vector for deadly viruses.
Robotics scholar Robin R. Murphy and the Robotics for Infectious Diseases
team she chairs have been tracking the way robots have been used during the
COVID-19 response worldwide.199 As of April 2020, Murphy’s team has
reported many reported uses of robots in healthcare settings or functions as part
of COVID-19 response. These uses have included: disinfecting physical spaces
(e.g., clinics and hospitals); telepresence abilities for healthcare workers (e.g.,
allowing a nurse to check on patient symptoms virtually); patient intake and
visitors; patient and family socializing; delivery and dispensing of food,
prescriptions, or other items; as well as testing (e.g., temperature scans).200 As
Murphy and her colleagues predict, the use of robots in COVID-19 response
may lead to an increased use of robots in healthcare or other settings, as well as
the development of new robots.201
The use of robots in healthcare settings for pandemic response raises
interesting legal questions. Ryan Calo has written extensively on the
“exceptional” nature of robots and the necessity for transforming laws to adapt
to the needs of regulating robots,202 including in the realm of privacy law.203 Calo
notes three unique characteristics of robots that will require transformations in
law: embodiment (i.e., physical presence), emergence (e.g., the potential for
autonomous, independent action), and social valence (here, the idea that robots
“feel different to us, more like living agents”).204 Other scholars have also noted
the distinctive privacy-regulation challenges stemming from these factors.205
199 Evan Ackerman, New Consortium Mobilizes Roboticists to Help With COVID-19 and Future
Crises, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/medical-robots/robotics-for-infectiousdiseases-consortium; How Robots Are Being Used for COVID-19, ROBOTICS FOR INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, https://roboticsforinfectiousdiseases.org/how-robots-are-being-used.html; Cat
Wise, How Robots and Other Tech Can Make the Fight Against Coronavirus Safer, PBS (May 4, 2020),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-robots-and-other-tech-can-make-the-fightagainst-coronavirus-safer.
200 See sources cited supra note 199. Id.
201 Robin R. Murphy et al., Robots Are Playing Many Roles in the Coronavirus Crisis—And
Offering Lessons for Future Disasters, CONVERSATION (Apr. 22, 2020, 7:46 AM EDT),
https://theconversation.com/robots-are-playing-many-roles-in-the-coronavirus-crisis-andoffering-lessons-for-future-disasters-135527.
202 ROBOT LAW (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016); Ryan Calo,
Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015).);
203 Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS (ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS, Patrick Lin, George Bekey & Keith Abney eds., 2011).
204 Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015).
205 For a scoping study of literature on the field, see Christoph: Lutz et al.,, The Privacy
Implications of Social Robots: Scoping Review and Expert Interviews, MOBILE MEDIA & COMM. 412
(2019).

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690004

PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC

51

While truly autonomous robots that are capable of acting without a “human
in the loop” are still a long way off, the physical embodiment of robots in
healthcare settings and in emergency response creates interesting challenges for
regulating these uses of robots. The types of robots used in healthcare and
emergency response contexts are, as Eduard Fosch Villaronga puts it, “complex
cyber-physical systems.”206 To regulate their use, the law must address the
privacy implications of both digital data collection and use as well as the privacy
harms specifically created by the physical presence of robots, their movements,
and their physical functions. As Lutz et al. describe, “[t]he dimension of physical
privacy is affected by the physical nature and mobility of social robots, while
social robots’ data collection and processing capacities affect users’ informational
privacy.”207 While technologies like medical AI and telemedicine platforms may
affect a person’s informational privacy, healthcare robots used in pandemic
response may affect both informational privacy and physical privacy.
Additionally, the privacy impacts of robots will be influenced by the social
valence of robots and our natural inclination to anthropomorphize certain
robots, ascribing to them characteristics and perhaps legal protections we
ordinarily would give to human beings.208 Many healthcare robots would likely
be designed as social robots, a category Kate Darling has defined as a robot that
is a “physically embodied, autonomous agent that communications and interacts
with humans on a social level,”209 often “communicat[ing] through social cues,
display[ing] adaptive learning behavior, and mimic[ing] various emotional
states.”210 Humans often display empathy toward social robots. One study
showed that humans were more likely to hesitate to strike a robot if the robot
had first been given a lifelike story, suggesting that stories may influence the
empathic responses of humans to robots.211 In a healthcare setting, particularly
in a dire emergency healthcare setting, humans may quickly link certain robots
with emotional stories or characteristics. For example, a healthcare robot that
regularly delivers pain-relieving medication to a coronavirus patient may become
EDWARD FOSCH-VILLARONGA, ROBOTS, HEALTHCARE, AND THE LAW (2019).
Christoph Lutz et al., The Privacy Implications of Social Robots: Scoping Review and Expert
Interviews, 7 MOBILE MEDIA & COMM. 412 (2019).
208 Brian R. Duffy, Anthropomorphism and the Social Robotsocial robot, 42 ROBOTICS &
AUTONOMOUS SYS. 179 (2003).
209 Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of Anthropomorphism,
Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW (Ryan Calo, A. Michael
Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016).
210 Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of Anthropomorphism,
Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW (Ryan Calo, A. Michael
Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016) ; CYNTHIA L. BREAZEAL, DESIGNING SOCIABLE ROBOTS
(2002).
211 Kate Darling et al., Empathic Concern and the Effect of Stories in Human-Robot Interaction, 24
PROC. IEEE INT’L WORKSHOP ON ROBOT & HUM. COMM. (RO-MAN) 770 (),2015)..
206
207
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associated with positive thoughts.
Both the emotionally intensive experience of being in a critical healthcare
space (for patients, loved ones, and healthcare workers) as well as the
emotionally intensive experience of living through a global pandemic may
contribute to healthcare robots being associated with emotions, stories, or other
human-like characteristics. This increased anthropomorphization of healthcare
robots in a pandemic may have impacts on privacy, as would the increased
emotional connections people may develop with the robots that function in this
space and time. For example, it’s possible people may experience greater privacy
loss, viewing the robot’s intrusions (physical or otherwise) as similar to that of a
human’s. It is also possible that individuals voluntarily give more data to robots
(for example, answering questions about symptoms), based on feeling an
emotional or quasi-human connection. On the other hand, it is also possible that
individuals feel less privacy impact, particularly if, as some believe, privacy is
most importantly considered a right to be let alone from the eyes of other
humans.212
Protecting the privacy rights of individuals dealing with healthcare robots
during a pandemic can be difficult, as many individuals do not understand how
robots work in practice and how the use of any particular robot may impact
their privacy.213 In fact, some have argued that notice and consent is not possible
with many types of robots used in healthcare, given the lack of information,
amount of new knowledge needed for many users, and the resulting difficulty
of obtaining truly informed consent.214
People who are ill may have less ability to advocate for themselves and
protect themselves from privacy violations due to the use of robots. Studies
have shown that women, people of color, disabled people, and other people
from marginalized backgrounds already suffer disproportionately negative
outcomes in healthcare, including simply not having their cares addressed by
healthcare workers.215 These people may be less able to advocate for themselves
212

(1890).

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193

213 Christoph Lutz et al.,, RoboCode-Ethicist: Privacy-Friendly Robots, an Ethical Responsibility of
Engineers?, PROC. ACM WEB SCI. CONF. 1 Conference.; Min Kyung Lee et al., Understanding
Users’ Perceptionusers’ of Privacy in Human–Robot Interaction, 6 human–robot interaction. PROC.
INT’L CONF.Conference ON HUM.-–ROBOT INTERACTION 181 (2011).
214 Heather Draper & Tom Sorell, Ethical Values and Social Care Robots for Older People, 19
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 49 (2017); Margot E.; Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 113
WASH. L. REV. Review 1113 (2015).
215 See, e.g., Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment
Recommendations, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences Between Blacks and Whites, 113 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4296 (2016),
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if they view the use of robots to be intrusive. (Though it is also possible that
healthcare robots may actually create greater equity in healthcare, depending on
one’s perception of the comparative biases of robots and humans in providing
equal care.) An additional dimension of healthcare in pandemic is the isolated
nature of patients, who are unable to have friends or family visit them and act
as patient advocates. If a coronavirus patient cannot muster the strength to ask
for a robot to be removed, there may be no one around them who can advocate
for them.
The privacy of people dealing with healthcare robots is particularly
important in an emotionally fraught time like a pandemic, especially in situations
where human lives are on the line. The physical presence of a robot may feel
more intrusive to someone in a heightened emotional state, or possibly, the
presence of a robot may be welcome, given the lack of other human contact. A
person’s expectation of and understanding of privacy in relation to robots will
likely change in this time and setting.
While it may be tempting to argue for laws regulating the use of robots, as a
category, the very different types of robots that are currently used and the
different settings in which they are used require specific regulation. Particularly
in sensitive contexts like healthcare, regulation of robots must happen in specific
forms, with attention paid to each particular sector and type of use.216
II. TECH AND PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC
The COVID-19 virus is fast-moving, highly contagious, deadly, and often
invisible. These factors have led to increased use of technologies allowing for
the replacement of some in-person human contact in government and corporate
functions. Additionally, the need to protect against the spread of the disease has
led to increased use of technologies, sometimes in novel ways. Finally, social
isolation and the shutdowns of many public and private spaces has led to an
increased use of technologies allowing people to connect to each other, socially
as well as for employment and education.
Government surveillance, be it for national security, intelligence, law
enforcement, or pandemic response purposes, is important to understand and
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM200008243430809; Elizabeth G. Nabel,
Coronary Heart Disease in Women—An Ounce of Prevention, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 572 (2000);
Rachel Rettner, Women Feel Pain More Intensely Than Men Do, SCI. AM. (Jan. 23, 2012),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/women-feel-pain-more-intensely./
216 Eduard Fosch Villaronga et al., Did I Tell You My New Therapist is a Robot? Ethical, Legal,
and Societal Issues of Healthcare and Therapeutic Robots (Oct. 17, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3267832.).
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important to limit, in the interest of protecting individual freedom from
government overreach. However, in the age of surveillance capitalism,217
surveillance by other actors has emerged as an equally important phenomenon
to study for privacy impacts. While employers, consumer-facing corporations,
and education providers have used technology in different ways during the
pandemic, it can be useful to understand this class of surveillance as distinct
from government surveillance conducted under traditional surveillance powers
and through traditional surveillance means. The following is a non-exhaustive
exploration of different ways the pandemic has changed privacy and technology
in these sectors: government, employment, education, and consumer
technology.
A. Government Surveillance
Governments worldwide have proposed different surveillance initiatives
dedicated to pandemic response. These include testing and contact tracing, the
use of new technologies, like facial recognition and drones, as well as increased
video and other forms of surveillance (including to enforce such measures as
social distancing and mask wearing218). The privacy risks of facial recognition
and drones219 have been much studied, as has been the rise of government
surveillance generally and correspondent harms to privacy. Robots have also
been deployed as part of government COVID-19 response, including for
monitoring, crowd dispersal, enforcing social distancing, identifying infected
people, and giving public information.220
The technologies are not new. (For example, one could easily draw a line
between the use of heat-sensing surveillance in Kyllo v. United States221 to the use
of heat-sensing robots in COVID-19 surveillance today.222) What has changed
is the use of the public-health rationale behind deploying these technologies at
a greater scale, and in more intrusive fashion. Government surveillance has used
technological tools, but this is perhaps the first time many of these tools have
SHOSHANNA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2018
).
Jared Newman, Smart Cameras Will Soon Check if You’re Social Distancing and Wearing a
Mask, FAST CO. (May 13, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90503911/smart-cameraswill-soon-check-if-youre-social-distancing-and-wearing-a-mask.
219 M. Ryan Calo, The Drone As Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2011);
Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CALIF L. REV.
CIRCUIT 57 (2013).
220 How Robots Are Being Used for COVID-19, ROBOTICS FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES,
https://roboticsforinfectiousdiseases.org/how-robots-are-being-used.html.
221 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).)
222 David Yaffe-Bellany, ‘Thermometer Guns’ on Coronavirus Front Lines Are ‘Notoriously Not
Accurate,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/business/coronavirus-temperature-sensor-guns.html.
217
218
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been used at a large scale, specifically for the stated purpose of protecting public
health.
Public health as rationale for privacy invasion is relatively new for many of
the technologies under discussion, though public safety has long been a fallback
excuse for any number of civil-liberties violations. Public health has also been
used as an excuse for violating privacy and civil rights in the past, including the
institutionalization of Mary Mallon, a poor woman believed to have infected
dozens of people with typhoid fever, including after she was publicly sanctioned
against doing so.223 Mallon, an asymptomatic typhoid carrier, was forcibly
quarantined twice and repeatedly subjected to unwanted medical tests. She
became the subject of public ridicule and died alone in forced isolation. Public
health can be an excuse governments use for any number of wrongs, and laws
should take care to prevent such harms. What is different now is specifically the
use of the public-health rationale for government surveillance using data-driven,
connected, and autonomous technologies.
It is important to note that the privacy-invasive programs that have been
used elsewhere have also been used as pandemic response, with public health
taking the place of other purposes, like public safety, controlling extremism, and
so on. For example, U.S. government agencies have considered or have adopted
contracts with Clearview AI224 and Palantir225 for pandemic response. Clearview
AI is the embattled facial-recognition company that scraped millions of
photographs from social media to develop a shadowy facial-recognition system
it then sold to both governments and corporations,226 potentially including
countries like Saudi Arabia that are not particularly known for protecting human
rights.227 Previously, law-enforcement agencies across America had been relying
Filio Marineli et al., Mary Mallon (1869-1938) and the History Of Typhoid Fever, 26 ANNALS
GASTROENTEROLOGY 132 (2013). s
224 Controversial Tech Company Pitches Facial Recognition to Track COVID-19, NBC NEWS (Apr.
27, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/now/video/controversial-tech-company-pitches-facialrecognition-to-track-covid-19-82638917537. This led to a response letter from Senator Ed
Markey. See Carrie Mihalcik, Senator Questions Clearview AI Over Coronavirus Tracking Plans, CNET
(May 1, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/senator-questions-clearview-ai-over-coronavirustracking-plans.
225 Nick Statt, Peter Thiel’s Controversial Palantir Is Helping Build a Coronavirus Tracking Tool for
the Trump Admin, VERGE (Apr. 21, 2020, 8:36 PM EDT),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/21/21230453/palantir-coronavirus-trump-contractpeter-thiel-tracking-hhs-protect-now.
226 Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facialrecognition.html.
227 Ryan Mac et al., Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has Been Used by the Justice Department,
ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law223
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on public safety and criminal justice as the primary rationales for implementing
facial-recognition surveillance, as well as related technological developments,
like drones, robots, and algorithmic processing.228 Many of these surveillance
tactics are not new, but the new and increased uses of government surveillance
during the pandemic merits attention.
Government surveillance in a pandemic raises interesting concerns for
privacy. First, future privacy legislation should take note of the public-health
rationale for privacy-invasive technologies and protect against abuse of that
moral justification. Second, more attention should be paid to the portability of
data collected for one crisis response and used in another. Or, more generally,
the law should address the current lack of strict purpose limitation in collection
of data and transfer to, access by, and use by government.
Further, potentially invasive programs should be undertaken only if they can
be developed in privacy-preserving ways, and only if they can be shown to be
actually effective from a practical, technical standpoint. It is too easy to allow
for unchecked use of surveillance technologies that have no link to actual
improvements in public health, leading to both a degradation in privacy and
civil-liberties norms as well as a loss of faith on the part of the public in their
governmental institutions.
Finally, it is likely that future crises will allow governments to exploit public
health, public safety, or other rationales to justify increasing amounts of
surveillance and use of privacy-invasive technologies.229 It will be difficult to
limit the onward sharing and downstream harms of data collected during these
crises. Thus, future privacy legislation should create protections for
downstream, distributed harms. This could include shifting to a data-protection
framework, with rights including the right to request deletion, as well as
algorithmic-accountability rights, including the right to contest results of an
algorithmically derived decision. Additionally, the law must solve for the
compound privacy harms raised by data aggregators, as we have seen
commercial data aggregators sell or share data to be added to government
surveillance programs.

enforcement.
228 Joseph Marks, The Cybersecurity 202: Privacy Experts Fear a Boom in Coronavirus Surveillance,
WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity202/2020/04/14/the-cybersecurity-202-privacy-experts-fear-a-boom-in-coronavirussurveillance/5e94901988e0fa101a7615be.
229
See Bert-Jaap Koops, The Concept of Function Creep, 13 Law, Innovation and
Technology 1 (2021).
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B. Employer Surveillance
Similar to what we have seen with government surveillance, the technology
used in corporate-employer surveillance is mostly not entirely novel or
constructed out of whole cloth for the pandemic. Employers have used new
technologies to track their employees in many forms for years,230 and scholars
have called for greater protections of employee privacy, particularly in the time
of digital technologies that make surveillance simple.231 However, what has
changed are: (1) the scale at which employers have used these technologies to
track employees; and (2) the use of a public-health rationale to justify employee
monitoring.
1. Remote Work Surveillance
One of the most widely practiced methods of pandemic response has been
for governments to encourage their residents to practice social distancing, while
shutting down many businesses and public and private spaces. Social distancing
in this context describes measures taken to maintain physical distance between
humans, with the goal of preventing spread of disease.232 Many states and
municipalities in the United States enforced orders that shut down non-essential
businesses, defined differently in each location.
For many white-collar workers, the pandemic has resulted in a switch to
working from home, using remote technologies. An early MIT study found that
an estimated 34.1% of Americans were working remotely from home by early
April 2020.233 Work from home has been a form of pandemic response. For
example, one factor possibly aiding Seattle’s public-health response was early
partnership with local technology companies in shifting much of their workforce
to remote.234 In contrast, some workplaces have remained open and functioning,
230 Steve Lohr, Unblinking Eyes Track Employees, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/technology/workplace-surveillance-sees-good-andbad.html; Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a
Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2018),https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/technology/workplace-surveillance-sees-goodand-bad.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-wristbandtracking-privacy.html.
231 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105
CALIFCal. L. REV. 735 (2017).
232 Kaitlyn Tiffany, The Dos and Don’ts of ‘Social Distancing,’ ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-what-does-socialdistancing-mean/607927.
233 Erik Brynjolfsson et al., COVID-19 and Remote Work: An Early Look at US Data (Apr.
8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://john-josephhorton.com/papers/remote_work.pdf.
234 Mary Harris, What Seattle Did Right, and Where New York Went Wrong, SLATE (May 1,
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utilizing new privacy-invasive programs in a purported attempt to safeguard
employees and consumers from the virus.
Workers working from home have relied on technologies, including
distributed work software and services like Microsoft SharePoint and Dropbox.
Many of these technologies come with their own privacy risks, from the everpresent risk of data breach to the risks of companies selling or sharing behavioral
and user data to data brokers or other parties for use in marketing or other
purposes users would not appreciate.
Additionally, some employers have implemented privacy-invasive software
choices, including requiring employees to keep cameras on through all working
hours,235 as well as using software that tracks every single thing employees are
doing on their computers during the workday (including browser search terms
and email text).236 Companies that provide employee-monitoring services,
including ActivTrak, Time Doctor, Hubstaff, Interguard, and Teramind,
reported huge increases in customer base and revenue, as told to the Washington
Post.237 Some have called this range of technologies “tattleware.”238
In lieu of in-person meetings, many have turned to using teleconferencing
and videoconferencing solutions, including Zoom, Microsoft Teams239, Google

2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/05/coronavirus-covid19-seattle-new-yorkresponses.html.
235 Drew Harwell, Managers Turn to Surveillance Software, Always-On Webcams to Ensure
Employees Are (Really) Working From Home, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:24 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/30/work-from-home-surveillance.
236 Drew Harwell, Managers Turn to Surveillance Software, Always-On Webcams to Ensure
Employees Are (Really) Working From Home, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:24 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/30/work-from-home-surveillance;
Adam Satariano, How My Boss Monitors Me While I Work From Home, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020),;
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/technology/employee-monitoring-work-from-homevirus.html.
237 Drew Harwell, Managers Turn to Surveillance Software, Always-On Webcams to Ensure
Employees Are (Really) Working From Home, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:24 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/30/work-from-home-surveillance.
238 Drew Harwell, Managers Turn to Surveillance Software, Always-On Webcams to Ensure
Employees Are (Really) Working From Home, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:24 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/30/work-from-home-surveillance.
239 Mark Hachman, Microsoft’s Solution for COVID-19 Is a Free Teams Subscription for Six
Months, PCWORLD (Mar. 4, 2020 3:45 PM PST),
https://www.pcworld.com/article/3530374/microsofts-solution-for-covid-19-is-a-free-teamssubscription-for-six-months.html.
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Hangout240, WebEx241, and more.242 Many of these technologies came with their
own privacy problems. Zoom in particular gained an early lead as the
videoconferencing software of choice for many, leading to increased scrutiny
from privacy and security advocates and researchers243 , as well as legal and
regulatory inquiry.244 While these companies should have done better in terms
of privacy, it is to some extent understandable why they failed. As a matter of
scale, it is likely these companies were not prepared to deal with a sudden largescale increase in users as well as a shift in their user base, from primarily
enterprise users to the general public at large. However, regardless of reason,
many of these companies failed to properly protect the privacy and security of
their users, at least in the beginning of the pandemic and the large shift to work
from home.
The increase use of remote working technology has also increased potential
for abuse of technologies. In the unfortunate #PoorJennifer case, a person was
recorded on a group Zoom chat and filmed taking their laptop into the restroom
with them – and then using the toilet, while still unknowingly on camera. 245 This
video was then shared on social media, without anonymization of names on the
call, likely to significant harm for the individual pictured. On a more minor level,
increased use of videoconferencing technology means that many will
unknowingly expose information about themselves, e.g., through items in the
240 Igor Bonifacic, Google Makes Hangouts Meet Features Free in the Wake of Coronavirus,
ENGADGET (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/2020-03-03-google-makes-hangoutsmeet-features-free-in-the-wake-of-coronavirus.html.
241 Jordan Novet, Cisco Says Webex Video-Calling Service Is Seeing Record Usage Too, Even as
Competitor Zoom Draws All the Attention, CNBC (Mar. 17, 2020, 2:49 PM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/17/cisco-webex-sees-record-usage-during-coronavirusexpansion-like-zoom.html.
242 Allen St. John, It’s Not Just Zoom. Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, and Webex Have Privacy
Issues, Too., YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 30, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/not-justzoom-google-meet-180813488.html.
243 See, e.g., Danielle Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Cyber Civil Rights in the Time of COVID19, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 14, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/cyber-civilrights-in-the-time-of-covid-19; Joseph Marks, The Cybersecurity 202: Privacy Experts Fear a Boom
in Coronavirus Surveillance, WASH. POST (Apr. 14,
2020),https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/cyber-civil-rights-in-the-time-of-covid-19/;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity202/2020/04/14/the-cybersecurity-202-privacy-experts-fear-a-boom-in-coronavirussurveillance/5e94901988e0fa101a7615be.
244 Maggie Miller, Zoom to Expand Security, Privacy Safeguards as Part of Agreement with New
York AG, HILL (May 7, 2020, 3:48 PM EDT),
https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/496664-zooms-to-expand-security-privacysafeguards-as-part-of-agreement-with.
245 Deborah Hastings, Zoom Blunders in the Age of COVID-19: Shirtless Lawyers, Flatulence and
Naked Spouses, INSIDE EDITION (Apr. 14, 2020, 2:19 PM PDT),
https://www.insideedition.com/zoom-blunders-in-the-age-of-covid-19-shirtless-lawyersflatulence-and-naked-spouses-59065.
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backgrounds of their home videos, or the potentially location-identifying views
through their home windows. The increased use of remote working
technologies that include photo, audio, or video also create greater content
moderation, speech regulation, and online harassment concerns for tech
platforms.246
On a theoretical level, some amount of privacy is lost when the social norm
is for individuals to open up their private homes to view for others in a work
context. This represents a fundamental shift in our understanding of public and
private spaces,247 as the office has traditionally been a semi-public space, while
the home is among our most private of places.248 The shift to remote work, aided
by omnipresent monitoring and the use of video chat software, has eroded the
line between office and home and changed the way people present themselves
in these contexts. This shift in contextual understanding249 may change the way
we understand privacy in both work and home contexts even past the pandemic.
As society’s reasonable expectations of privacy shift, so too will our legal
interpretation of such understandings and how the law should regulate
technology and privacy.
2. In-Person Corporate Surveillance
For workers not privileged enough to work safely indoors during the
pandemic, a mess of privacy problems have arisen during the pandemic. Even
as the pandemic subsides, some of these in-person surveillance measures may
continue, at least for a period of time. For example, we may see temperature
checks or COVID-19 testing enforcement for employees as businesses return
to physical office spaces.
Companies have used digital technologies to surveil employees in-person for
many years.250 For example, Amazon has been tracking employee movement
through mandatory digital connected wristbands since at least 2014.251 In
246 Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108
MICH. REV. 373, 392-99 (2009).
247 Julie E. Cohen, L. Cyberspace as/and Space, 107.” COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1535 (2019).
248 Anita L. Allen, The Declining Significance of Home: Privacy “Whilst Quiet” and of No Use to
Artists or Anyone, 4 HA: THE JOURNAL OF THE HANNAH ARENDT CENTER FOR POLITICS AND
HUMANITIES AT BARD COLLEGE 84 (2016).
249 See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life,
Stanford University Press, 2009.
250 Steve Lohr, Unblinking Eyes Track Employees, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/technology/workplace-surveillance-sees-good-andbad.html.
251 Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a Patent
for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018),
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response to pandemic concerns, companies have also rolled out similar
wearables to track employees and enforce social distancing in the workplace.252
Factories and warehouses have become hot spots for infection and viral
transmission.253 In response, many corporations have instituted privacy-invasive
programs in an attempt to ensure the safety of their workers, products, and
consumers. Some have required temperature testing before entering the
workspace, surveys asking employees for symptoms, and contact tracing for any
infected employees. In April 2020, the EEOC released new guidance on
employer responsibilities concerning COVID-19 and ADA protections,
suggesting that employers should be allowed to “administer COVID-19 testing
to employees before they enter the workplace to determine if they have the
virus.”254 While some employers may have also considered the use of antibody
tests or immunity passports, neither type of program has emerged as a leading
trend yet.
3. Digital Inequities
It is also important to note the disparate impact of digital employee
surveillance on different groups. For example, women may face more negative
consequences from abuse of their photos or video content recorded in remote
work settings.255 Privacy harms related to the unwanted exposure of revealing or
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-wristband-trackingprivacy.html.
252 Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Buzzing Bracelets Could Become a Workplace Accessory in
the Coronavirus Era, WASH. POST (May 14, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology202/2020/05/14/the-technology-202-buzzing-bracelets-could-become-a-workplaceaccessory-in-the-coronavirus-era/5ebc46fd88e0fa17cddfa4c0.
253 Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, South Dakota Meat Plant Is Now Country’s Biggest
Coronavirus Hot Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/us/coronavirus-south-dakota-meat-plantrefugees.html, Hannah Drier, ‘A Recipe For Disaster’: American Prison Factories Becoming Incubators
for Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2020, 7:40 PM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-recipe-for-disaster-american-prison-factoriesbecoming-incubators-for-coronavirus/2020/04/21/071062d2-83f3-11ea-ae26989cfce1c7c7_story.html; Annie Palmer, As Coronavirus Kills Another Amazon Worker, the
Company’s Response Is Adding to Employees’ Fears, CNBC (May 6 2020, 5:00 PM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/amazon-worker-in-illinois-dies-of-coronavirus.html.
254 What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other
EEO Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitationact-and-other-eeo-laws.
255 Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN.L. REV. 1175 (2000); Danielle
Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV.
373, 392-99 (2009).
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explicit personal content, in particular, may have worse consequences for
women.256 This may be more likely to occur with greater use of remote work
technologies. (Home computing devices and remote devices are likely less
secure than devices routinely maintained and updated on secure office networks
in the workplace.) Women, people of color, LGBT people, and other people
from marginalized groups also may face greater harassment through remote
work technologies, as they often face greater online harassment through
communication platforms.257 People from marginalized groups already face
discrimination in the workplace,258 so they may be less able to fight back against
encroaching employer privacy invasions as well.
While white-collar workers may face digital surveillance through remote
work, it is possible that some of these surveillance methods will decrease when
workers return to the office. However, workers in different settings, including
factories and warehouses, are unlikely to see a change, as they will continue to
work in the same settings pre- and post-pandemic. These workers are also likely
to have less power in fighting back against employer surveillance. Many of the
people doing these jobs belong to lower income, lower education, rural,
formerly incarcerated, or other marginalized groups in society. Low-income
workers, contract workers, and gig-economy workers often have to face greater
privacy violations in the course of business, with less power to fight against
employer abuses. Effectively, pandemic-driven employer surveillance may
create even greater inequalities in employee privacy, with higher-income and
white-collar workers suffering fewer privacy harms for potentially shorter time
periods.
Not only will people from already marginalized segments of society face
greater privacy harms related to technology uses by employers in public-health
emergency, but these privacy and labor harms are compounded in complex ways
for those who face discrimination and disparate impacts due to more than one
of their identities, creating intersectional privacy harms that are often not
considered in privacy laws. Additionally, increased corporate surveillance, while
worrisome for employees, may also be harmful for corporations. Individuals
need privacy to be able to innovate,259 to produce the creative insights and work
256 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Danielle K. Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870 (2019).
257 Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051 (2018);
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay Online Communities, 44 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 987 (2019).
258 Maryam Jameel & Joe Yerardi, Workplace Discrimination Is Illegal. But Our Data Shows It’s
Still a Huge Problem., VOX (Feb. 28, 2019, 8:29 AM EST), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/2/28/18241973/workplace-discrimination-cpi-investigation-eeoc.
259 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (, 2013)..
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that corporations need to be economically successful.
Gig-economy workers will also face disparate harms, as most are considered
independent contractors, without the benefits and protections given to
employees.260 The drastic fall in the economy has caused millions of Americans
to lose their jobs or face cuts in job hours,261 perhaps leading some to venture
into gig-economy positions that may still be functioning as “essential” work.
Instacart, a gig-economy platform that connects consumers with workers who
shop and then deliver groceries and other items from stores, saw an explosion
in their workforce and profits. In early May 2020, the company announced that
it had recruited 300,000 new workers in a month, with plans to hire 250,000, at
the same time that the company also announced it had hit its sales goals through
2022.262
Gig-economy or sharing companies like Instacart often already operated on
an information asymmetry, profiting from the data gathered on consumers and
gig-economy workers alike, with their independent-contractor workers unable
to fight against privacy invasions.263 Gig-economy workers already have few
privacy protections and are often subject to surveillance and data collection and
tracking from companies. Many gig-economy workers are uniquely vulnerable,
as they often have difficulty finding other employment,264 so they have less
ability to fight against corporate privacy invasions. These privacy harms likely
were exacerbated or at least continued at a greater scale during the pandemic.
There is little incentive for these companies to increase privacy protections,
particularly as they are not treating gig-economy workers as employees but
rather as independent contractors. Gig-economy workers often also face some
of the same vulnerabilities as blue collar workers, and depending on the job, the
groups often intersect, creating intersectional harms that multiply for workers
who experience overlapping forms of vulnerability in the workplace.
260 Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623 ( 2017).
261 Rachel Siegel & Andrew Van Dam, 3.8 Million Americans Sought Jobless Benefits Last Week,
Extending Pandemic’s Grip on the National Workforce, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 5:03 PM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/30/weekly-jobless-claimsunemployment.
262 Tyler Sonnemaker, Instacart’s Army of Shoppers Has Exploded from 180,000 to 500,000 Since
the Start of the Pandemic—And Some Workers Say It’s Making the Job More Difficult for Everyone, MSN
(May 8, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/other/instacarts-army-of-shoppers-hasexploded-from-180000-to-500000-since-the-start-of-the-pandemic-and-some-workers-say-itsmaking-the-job-more-difficult-for-everyone/ar-BB13O564.
263 Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623 (2017).
264 Univ. Cal. - Santa Cruz, Already Vulnerable, Gig Economy Workers in SF Suffer During
Pandemic, Survey Finds, PHYS ORG (May 5, 2020), https://phys.org/news/2020-05-vulnerablegig-economy-workers-sf.html.
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4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Employee Privacy
With employer surveillance as with government surveillance, we have not
necessarily seen new technologies develop in reaction to pandemic needs.
Rather, what has happened is a change in scale and rationale: greater use of
existing technologies for digital surveillance; and a new justification for use of
these privacy-invasive technologies. (A similar phenomenon has occurred with
government surveillance, as discussed previously.) Before the pandemic, digital
employee surveillance was often justified for economic and efficiency reasons.265
Now, during the pandemic, employers are justifying digital surveillance for
reasons related to public health (including the social health benefits of keeping
remote coworkers connected266).
Scholars have called for greater legal protections for employees against
corporate surveillance. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Jason Schultz, and Kate Crawford
proposed three solutions: (1) an omnibus federal information-privacy law that
would include employee protections; (2) a sector-specific Employee Privacy
Protection Act; or (3) a more limited sector-specific and context-specific
Employee Health Information Privacy Act.267 For Ajunwa et al., “the protection
of workers’ privacy is a civil rights issue: both for the protection of human
dignity rights and because privacy invasions can serve as vehicles for unlawful
discrimination.”268 Employee health information is particularly important to
protect in the midst of a public-health emergency, but generally, the privacy
rights of employees are something the law should take pains to protect, given
the power asymmetry between employers and employees.
It appears likely that employer surveillance will continue. If anything, the
rise in employer surveillance during this pandemic will likely raise the floor for
employer surveillance after the pandemic is over. Thus, it will become even
more important for the law to protect employees. Lawmakers in the United
States should include specific employee-centric provisions in future national
privacy regulation. Additionally, laws like HIPAA and GINA can be amended
to strengthen protections employees have against employer collection, use, and
sharing of their health and genetic data.
265 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason, Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105
CALIF L. REV. 735 (2017).
266 Drew Harwell, Managers Turn to Surveillance Software, Always-On Webcams to Ensure
Employees Are (Really) Working From Home, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:24 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/30/work-from-home-surveillance.
267 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 735 (2017).
268 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 735 (2017).
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While many advocates have called for greater privacy protections of
employees, employers now have new justification for digital surveillance
programs. With the public-health crisis still in full swing, it is likely that publichealth rationales will prove persuasive, allowing employers to expand
surveillance programs. Even after the pandemic subsides, these changes in
employment-surveillance norms will likely have long-term effects. Norms will
shift, and societal expectations of privacy will shift, paving the way for even
more employee surveillance in the future.
C. Education Privacy in Pandemic
In response to the pandemic, both public and private schools in many states
and municipalities have shut down, including K-12 schools as well as highereducation settings. In early March, ABC News estimated more than 290 million
students worldwide have had school disrupted due to COVID-19.269 As schools
have closed physical, in-person spaces, many have shifted to remote, online
teaching. With that shift has come a natural change in relationships with privacy
and technology, on the part of students, parents and guardians of younger
students, educators, and education institutions.
Student privacy has long been an issue in an era of digital learning and
connected tools. From the ill-fated One Laptop per Child program,270 to positive
uses of technology in the physical classroom, to innovative online-learning
developments, technology has changed the way education is done in our society.
Changes in society have also changed education technology. For example, the
rise of wireless and broadband access to the internet, as well as the increased
access to mobile devices, has allowed for education services to proliferate online,
including educators teaching through YouTube, apps like Khan Academy and
Duolingo, and the phenomenon of massive open online courses (MOOCs) and
other “virtual learning environments,”271 as well as free, open-knowledge
resources like Wikipedia. All of these new technological innovations come with
their own privacy issues. Additionally, many students have faced a loss of
physical education privacy, as many have been forced to move home or stay
home, losing the physical privacy a school or library may have provided.
The primary laws protecting student privacy in the United States include the
269 Kelly McCarthy, The Global Impact of Coronavirus on Education, ABC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2020,
2:54 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/global-impact-coronaviruseducation/story?id=69411738.
270 MORGAN AMES, THE CHARISMA MACHINE (2019).)
271 Elana Zeide and Helen Nissenbaum, Learner Privacy in MOOCs and Virtual Education, 16
THEORY AND RESEARCH IN EDUCATION 3 (2018).
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Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which protects children’s
online privacy, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),
which protects student records held by public institutions. These laws generally
target privacy protection to specifically protect the privacy of a class of users
(children), a type of data (student records), or a setting (public educational
institutions). However, these and other privacy laws do not protect a broader
conception of educational privacy, which includes protection of the physical or
virtual space272 necessary for students and educators to freely engage in the
pursuit of knowledge.
Julie E. Cohen has argued for privacy as a right that protects the ability for
individuals to creatively explore and create their identities.273 Neil Richards has
identified the right to intellectual privacy, the privacy necessary to safeguard our
intellectual thoughts and develop new ideas freely.274 Ari Ezra Waldman has
called for privacy law to protect “safe social spaces” in which “environments of
information exchange in which disclosure norms are counterbalanced by norms
of trust backed endogenously by design and exogenously by law.”275 Building on
these concepts, we ought to understand educational privacy as a distinct privacy
right that safeguards the ability for a student to safely explore ideas and
knowledge, to develop their intellectual selves and their personal selves, as well
as the ability for educators and researchers to facilitate and participate in
intellectual endeavors in the education context. This educational privacy right
should be linked to the essential purpose for education to provide social space
for students to learn and grow through learning, for educators to impart
knowledge and foster intellectual growth, and for researchers to produce and
disseminate knowledge.
During the pandemic, privacy issues with remote learning technologies and
innovations have only increased,276 as more students and learners are pushed to
take learning from the physical to digital realm. Students have lost much of their
educational privacy interests, harms sometimes aided and sometimes
ameliorated by use of technologies.
1. Education Technology

272

(2008)

Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181-201

Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013).
Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008).
275 Ari Ezra Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, 96 Washington University L. Rev. 153 (2019).
276 Jane Bailey et al., Children’s Privacy Is at Risk With Rapid Shifts to Online Schooling Under
Coronavirus, CONVERSATION (Apr. 21, 2020 10:08 AM EDT),
https://theconversation.com/childrens-privacy-is-at-risk-with-rapid-shifts-to-onlineschooling-under-coronavirus-135787.
273
274
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Shifting education to remote, online spaces has led to an explosion in the
use of education-surveillance technology, including software installed on schoolsanctioned devices that can track the activity of students using the device. This
category of privacy-violating technology also includes exam-proctoring
software,277 like Proctorio, a program which uses facial-detection software to
monitor students taking an exam online, by tracking eye movements,
background activity, and noise—all through access to the student’s camera and
microphone.278 These programs can collect many forms of data from students,
including photos, video recordings of students at their computers, voice data,
browsing history, keystroke data, and more.279
The increased use and reliance on digital-education technology tools has
raised concerns for privacy. Many of these programs have come under fire in
the early phases of the pandemic for a wide variety of privacy and security
concerns. Zoom, a remote videoconferencing application, found itself the
subject of investigation by the New York Attorney General’s Office for privacy
concerns,280 and the city of New York temporarily stopped use of Zoom for all
public schools.281 Some of the privacy harms from this shift to online learning
could be ameliorated by focusing more attention to asynchronous learning as
opposed to live sessions where students must log in and potentially have video
and audio on. Asynchronous learning could also aid in lessening unequal access
to education in times of public-health crisis and the effects of the digital
divide.282
Monica Chin, Exam Anxiety: How Remote Test-Proctoring Is Creeping Students Out, VERGE
(Apr. 29, 2020, 8:00 AM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/29/21232777/examityremote-test-proctoring-online-class-education.
278 Jake Evans, ANU to Use Facial Detection Software on Student Computers in Response to
Coronavirus Remote Exams, ABC (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-0420/coronavirus-anu-to-use-ai-spying-software-on-student-computers/12164324.
279 Barbara Fedders, The Constant and Expanding Classroom: Surveillance in K-12 Public Schools,
97 N.C. L. Rev. 1673 (2019).
280 Danny Hakim & Natasha Singer, New York Attorney General Looks Into Zoom’s Privacy
Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/technology/new-york-attorney-general-zoomprivacy.html; Lauren Feiner, Zoom Strikes a Deal with NY AG Office, Closing the Inquiry Into Its
Security Problems, CNBC (May 7, 2020, 3:54 PM EDT),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/technology/new-york-attorney-general-zoomprivacy.html; https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/07/zoom-strikes-a-deal-with-ny-ag-officeclosing-security-inquiry.html.
281 Valerie Strauss, School Districts, Including New York City’s, Start Banning Zoom Because of
Online Security Issues, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2020, 12:31 PM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/04/04/school-districts-including-newyork-citys-start-banning-zoom-because-online-security-issues.
282 Kelly A. Hogan & Viji Sathy, 8 Ways to Be More Inclusive in Your Zoom Teaching, CHRON.
(Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/8-Ways-to-Be-More-Inclusive-in/248460;
Hannah Natanson, Live vs. Tape-Delayed: How Two Approaches to Online Learning Change Life for
277
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Additionally, using digital platforms for learning comes with potential for
harassment and abuse. Early in the pandemic, the phenomenon known as
“Zoombombing” began occurring, as people started to use Zoom as a venue
for harassment and disruption.283 A Connecticut teen was charged with
computer crime for Zoombombing—in this case, entering a high school’s
online classes and disrupting the class with obscene language and hand
gestures.284 Harmful activity on Zoom and other online video-conferencing
platforms reached a bad enough threshold that the FBI released an article285 on
guidance for defending against these attacks, and the Department of Homeland
Security’s Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) also
published guidance on this issue.286
These education technologies are not new, but the scale at which they are
being used is new, as most schools around the world have shut down physical
campuses. It is possible that more schools will rely on distance education in the
future, perhaps due to familiarity gained during the pandemic. As such, these
technologies—and their impact on privacy—will become even more important
in the future.
2. In-Person Campus Surveillance
As schools attempt to reopen in full or in part, a number have proposed inperson testing requirements, such as temperature scanning, COVID-19 virus
Teachers and Students, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2020, 6:34 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/live-vs-tape-delayed-how-twoapproaches-to-online-learning-change-life-for-teachers-and-students/2020/04/25/250fb7d07bfe-11ea-9bee-c5bf9d2e3288_story.html.
283 David Z. Morris, Zoom Meetings Keep Getting Hacked. Here’s How to Prevent ‘Zoom Bombing’
on Your Video Chats, FORTUNE (Apr. 2, 2020, 2:45 PM EDT),
https://fortune.com/2020/04/02/zoom-bombing-what-is-meeting-hacked-how-to-preventvulnerability-is-zoom-safe-video-chats; Hannah Sparks, Trolls Crash Zoom Alcoholics Anonymous
Meetings: ‘Alcohol Is Soooo Good,’ N.Y. POST (Apr. 2, 2020, 11:55 AM EDT),
https://nypost.com/2020/04/02/trolls-crash-zoom-aa-meetings-alcohol-is-soooo-good.
284 Teen Arrested After ‘Zoom Bombing’ High School Classes, N.Y. POST (Apr. 8, 2020, 11:55
AM EDT), https://nypost.com/2020/04/08/teen-arrested-after-zoom-bombing-high-schoolclasses.
285 Press Release, FBI Boston, FBI Warns of Teleconferencing and Online Classroom
Hijacking During COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/contactus/field-offices/boston/news/press-releases/fbi-warns-of-teleconferencing-and-onlineclassroom-hijacking-during-covid-19-pandemic.
286 Press Release, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, FBI Releases Guidance
on Defending Against VTC Hijacking and Zoom-Bombing, (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.uscert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/04/02/fbi-releases-guidance-defending-against-vtchijacking-and-zoom.
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testing, or possibly immunity passports or other verification.287 The purported
goals are to help recreate the benefits of having physical school spaces, including
reducing the disparate impact on marginalized students who are harmed more
by the shutting down of schools.
However, increased testing and data collection on campus can have a
harmful impact on privacy rights for students and staff in educational
institutions. First, any new collection of data will create risks of data exposure,
including to hackers and bad actors. Second, testing on campus would come
with the same issues related to COVID-19 testing in general, as would immunity
passports or other forms of COVID-related medical verification used on
campus.
What would differentiate these privacy-invasive measures from other forms
of surveillance and data collection would be the educational context and the
educational institution as the primary data controller and possibly the primary
physical point of data collection. This narrows the field for regulation slightly,
as some of the privacy harms can be stemmed solely by regulating educational
instructions and educational privacy rights. Here, laws like FERPA and HIPAA
may apply in only limited manners.
Increasing surveillance in-person on campus could lead to a loss in students’
expectations of privacy. Students may feel like they have less privacy on campus,
due to an increased surveillance apparatus present throughout the campus
experience. This could lead to a loss in perceived educational privacy
protections, making students less willing or able to pursue their intellectual
interests and develop their knowledge and skills.
3. Digital Inequities
Distance learning has a potentially discriminatory impact on some groups.
The shift to online learning exposes in even starker terms the digital divide,
highlighting those who live in “digital poverty,” with less or no access to the
internet or computing devices.288 An estimated 17% of students nationwide lack
287 See, e.g., Jenna Zibton, Virginia Schools Preparing for a Variety of Scenarios When Students
Return in the Fall, WSLS 10 NEWS (May 13, 2020, 7:53 AM), See, e.g.,
https://www.wsls.com/news/local/2020/05/12/virginia-schools-preparing-for-manyscenarios-when-students-return-in-the-fall.
288 Deborah Brown, Closing the ‘Digital Divide’ Critical in COVID-19 Response, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Mar. 25, 2020, 1:15 PM EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/25/closingdigital-divide-critical-covid-19-response; Dana Goldstein et al., As School Moves Online, Many
Students Stay Logged Out, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/coronavirus-schools-attendance-absent.html;
Nicole Gaudiano, Coronavirus Quarantines Could Rob Poor, Rural Students of Access to Education,
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access to a computer at home, and an additional 18% lack access to broadband
internet at home.289 Before the pandemic, many of these students could have
taken classes in person and relied on libraries, cafes, and other spaces for access
to the internet and/or computers. During the pandemic, these options
evaporated, worsening the already problematic digital divide.290
This shift to remote education has also caused unequal privacy harms that
have impacted groups in disparate ways. Privacy-invasive education surveillance
systems often require access to devices and the internet, which can further
exacerbate digital inequalities. Students who lack stable internet access have not
been able to participate in school and related education activities now moved
online. Similar problems have faced students who do not have access to their
own computer or mobile device, some of whom must share limited remotecomputing equipment with multiple family members. Privacy-invasive software
that scans activities and files on devices will thus harm the privacy both of the
student as well as anyone else using the device, creating disparate privacy harms
for low-income families who share devices.
Just as the shift to remote online work has changed the boundaries between
work and home, affecting the way society understands these two separate
contexts and the corresponding expectations of privacy in each,291 so has the
shift to remote education changed the boundaries between school and home.
Students have certain expectations of privacy in the education setting. At the
very least, there is an expectation, especially among older K-12 students and
higher-education students, that schools offer spaces for private exploration of
ideas and identities292 and learning without undue interference from family. For
college students, this often meant an entirely separate physical surrounding, for
POLITICO (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/10/coronavirusquarantines-rural-students-125048; Poor U.S. Students Miss Out As Virtual Learning Sharpens
Divide, MSN (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/poor-us-students-missout-as-virtual-learning-sharpens-divide/ar-BB12NEgC; Shoshana Wodinsky, Not Everyone Can
Go to School Online, GIZMODO (Apr. 7, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://gizmodo.com/not-everyonecan-go-to-school-online-1842726588.
289 Million of Kids Are Struggling in School Because They Don’t Have Internet Access at Home,
MARKET WATCH (June 10, 2019, 4:22 PM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nearly3-million-students-in-the-us-struggle-to-keep-up-in-school-due-to-lack-of-home-internet-201906-10.
290 Dana Goldstein et al., As School Moves Online, Many Students Stay Logged Out, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/coronavirus-schools-attendanceabsent.html.
291 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009).
292 JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY
OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904
(2013).
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the many who lived in school dorms or on their own in college towns.
Even for those living at home, schools provided spaces where students
could expect to listen to lectures with a certain sense of privacy from some
parties (namely, family). On the verso, students previously had an expectation
of privacy regarding the separation of their home from their schools. They could
reasonably expect that they would be able to protect information about their
homes from the eyes of their fellow students or educators. Students who may
have been able to pursue study of subjects independent of family consideration
now lose the privacy of having separate educational spaces. (Consider the
closeted gay teen studying LGBT history in defiance of religious conservative
parents, who now must do all research from home, on shared devices.)
With the shift to online learning, students are unable to protect the divide
between their home and school spaces. Students in families facing more
financial stress in this time are also at a disadvantage. Older students may be
pressed to take on more work hours to make up for lost wages from other family
members. Younger students may lack the parental supervision necessary for
setting up and engaging in remote education. (For example, someone has to
make sure to turn on the computer and connect to the online video session at
the right times every day.) All of these personal financial circumstances may now
be made public, or at least become visible to fellow students and educators, as
the privacy-invasive nature of education technologies would expose situational
factors like whether a parent was consistently able to help a younger student
during class.
The increased use of remote communication technologies in education also
creates disadvantages for some students, based on income and socio-economic
status.293 Consider the student living in a multigenerational household with
parents, grandparents, and multiple siblings all in one small apartment, where it
may be difficult to find any space quiet and isolated enough to participate fully
in online classes or to do online study, even during the times the student is able
to wrangle the family’s single computer for use. This student might not have
steady Wi-Fi access or may be defaulting to a limited mobile data plan for
accessing the internet. This student would be at a profound disadvantaged
compared to a classmate who had access to better technology and home
support.
The pandemic has changed our society’s understanding of schools and
homes as spaces,294 and has blurred the divide between school and home,
Michele E. Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 140304 (2012).
294 Cohen, Jean L. “Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007).”; Ari Ezra
293
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resulting in new understandings of what should be a reasonable expectation of
privacy in either context.295 Students learning online through video
communications technologies must now allow their fellow students and teachers
into the privacy of their homes, including (for some) whatever objects are in
viewing distance of their computers. Students who live in physical settings
without the space and quiet necessary for learning via distance education have
been placed at a disadvantage. Some students may feel a sense of shame about
showing photos or videos of their home environments to other students.
Consider the lower-income scholarship student at a private school who must
now virtually invite their wealthier peers to view their home. However,
technology can also be used to help ameliorate some of these harms. For
example, students have taken to using Zoom virtual backgrounds to keep their
homes from public view even while on video chat.296
Many students will suffer disparate harms in this time of pandemic. Not only
will lower income students face financial stresses with less ability to fight against
privacy invasions,297 but students who are themselves parents will face greater
burdens as they attempt to navigate their studies (and sometimes work) at the
same time as handling childcare. Even in households where both parents work
from home, women have still been doing more childcare and more household
work during the pandemic era.298 This means a disproportionate harm to women
students,299 as they will have less time to keep up with schoolwork compared to
their male peers. This sharp inequality will also be reflected in more burdens on
women who must parent children as they navigate new education technologies
when schools are shut down.300 Women may be found to be less productive301
Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1535 (2019).
295 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009).
296 Zita Fontaine, Zoom’s Virtual Backgrounds Help Fight Inequality, MEDIUM (Apr. 12, 2020),
https://medium.com/age-of-awareness/zooms-virtual-backgrounds-help-fight-inequality624da895634e.
297 Michele E. Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 140304 (2012).
298 Claire Cain Miller, Nearly Half of Men Say They Do Most of the Home Schooling. 3 Percent of
Women Agree., N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/upshot/pandemic-chores-homeschoolinggender.html.
299 Jennifer Medina & Lisa Lerer, When Mom’s Zoom Meeting Is the One That Has to Wait,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/womencoronavirus-2020.html.
300 Claire Cain Miller, Nearly Half of Men Say They Do Most of the Home Schooling. 3 Percent of
Women Agree., N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/upshot/pandemic-chores-homeschoolinggender.html.
301 Colleen Flaherty, No Room of One’s Own, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/04/21/early-journal-submission-data-suggest-
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than their peers as both students and workers who happen to be parents of
students. Women likely will bear the bulk of the burden in supporting their
children in transitioning to remote learning technologies, and will likely then
suffer unique and disproportionate privacy harms302 related to the use of such
technologies.303
Students, parents, and educators may all face disparate harms due to
coronavirus epidemic as well as the push to online learning aided by new
technologies. These harms may fall upon those who belong to low-income,
rural, undocumented, disabled, or other groups. An additional harm may simply
be that students will be pressed to disclose their conditions to educators, fellow
students, and administrators during this time. For example, students with some
“hidden” disabilities may be forced to ask for accommodations, if their
disabilities make remote distance learning difficult.304 This disclosure can lead to
a loss of privacy and a sense of lack of control over one’s own personal health
information, financial information, or more.
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Education Privacy
a. Existing Protections Are Not Enough
The educational privacy interests of students are particularly important to
safeguard in a public-health emergency. As Elana Zeide writes, students may
themselves be an especially vulnerable population when it comes to privacy.305
Many students are children, a class the law has consistently recognized as
deserving of particular protections, including within U.S. privacy
jurisprudence.306 Students often have little choice regarding the educationalprivacy practices of their schools.307 As Zeide notes, FERPA and similar state
laws “were designed for a world of paper records, not networked, cloud-based
platforms that collect information automatically”308—i.e., the very platforms
covid-19-tanking-womens-research-productivity.
302 ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988).
303 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Anita L. Allen,
Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2000).
304 Johnathan Custodio, Disabled Students Already Faced Learning Barriers. Then Coronavirus
Forced an Abrupt Shift to Online Classes., CHRON. (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Disabled-Students-Already/248444.
305 Elana Zeide, Education Technology and Student Privacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 70-70 (Evan Selinger, Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene eds., 2018).
306 See The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6505
(2018). A
307 Elana Zeide, Education Technology and Student Privacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 70- (Evan Selinger, Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene eds., 2018).
308 Elana Zeide, Education Technology and Student Privacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 70- (Evan Selinger, Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene eds., 2018).
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being utilized at great scale by educational institutions during this shift to online
learning.
Only public educational institutions, or institutions that receive public
funding, are subject to FERPA.309 FERPA imposes certain obligations on public
educational institutions, as well as (by proxy) institutions that receive data from
them. FERPA imposes restrictions on access and transfer of student data and
allows students and parents certain rights regarding student data. However,
FERPA is limited to only applying to public institutions, and many schools are
private. During the pandemic, most schools, public and private, transitioned to
online learning. Many schools, public or private, have also relied on private
education-technology companies. While the data collected and transmitted by
the public institution would be protected under FERPA, public institutions may
still be encouraging use of private companies’ technologies, which would not
necessarily be covered, depending on how data is collected from students. Zeide
notes that the institutional reliance on FERPA creates undue burden for
students, parents, and educators, and fails to protect the privacy of students.310
Second, FERPA only applies to certain educational student records and not
all student data collected in the course of educational experience. For example,
while student grades would be considered data covered under FERPA, photos
of students taken during exam monitoring would not. Third, FERPA allows for
a variety of permitted disclosures of student records, including to other
organizations acting on behalf of the school for legitimate purposes. With more
parties having access to student data, it is more difficult to safeguard the privacy
of students. Additionally, new forms of data are being generated that may or
may not be considered protectable under FERPA. (Consider, for example,
screenshots of Zoom sessions that include small profile photos or live camera
of students. While school photographs can be protectable under FERPA, this
new class of content or data may not be.) FERPA is rather limited in scope and
does rather little to protect students or their parents and guardians from the
privacy impacts of the pandemic-fueled shifts in use of technology.311
Many education technology companies will have to comply with privacy
laws and general consumer-protection laws. FTC authority would extend to
companies and services like Zoom, WebEx, Google Classrooms, and exammonitoring companies. For these education companies and platforms, the FTC
309

(2019).

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 99

310 Elana Zeide, Student Privacy Principles for the Age of Big Data: Moving Beyond FERPA and
FIPPs, 8 DREXEL L.Law REV. 339 (2016).
311
Elana Zeide, Student Privacy Principles for the Age of Big Data: Moving Beyond FERPA and
FIPPs, 8 DREXEL L.Law REV. 339 (2016).
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could still enforce similar privacy protections as it would in other sectors.
Education technology companies thus have to adhere to similar standards as all
companies regarding privacy, including posting privacy notices and
(importantly) not violating any of the terms that they set out in their privacy
notices or terms of service. If a company were found to have not upheld the
representations they made out to consumers in their terms, the FTC would have
authority to enforce judgments against them.
Additionally, for education settings involving children, additional federal
and state legal protections would apply for children’s privacy. The Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) protects the privacy of children under
thirteen. Under COPPA, companies must adhere to a set of standards, including
posting visible privacy policies and obtaining verifiable parental consent before
collecting the data of children under thirteen. Parents and guardians of children
under thirteen also have special rights under COPPA, including a right to revoke
consent at any time and request that a company delete their child’s data. Some
states also have special protections for children’s privacy. For example,
California’s “eraser law” allows children under eighteen to request companies
delete their data, among other rights.312
However, even with existing protections, privacy laws in the United States
are insufficient to protect privacy, for consumers as students and as individuals.
Private-sector privacy laws do not sufficiently protect against the harms of Big
Data and the downstream harms of data that may be abused or used against a
person after sale, transfer, aggregation, reidentification, or more.313 U.S. privacy
law must safeguard civil liberties against the threat of data brokers and the data
economy. Individuals need a way to legally seek recourse for distributed
downstream data harms, including harms compounded by biased or faulty
algorithmic systems.314 One way to do this is to create better laws addressing
algorithmic harms, allowing individuals to seek redress for incorrectly made
algorithmic decisions that impact fundamental rights, for example.
b. A Right to Educational Privacy
Current laws dealing with education and privacy protect privacy rights based
on types of data subjects: students, consumers, and so on. However, these laws
do not protect the right of an individual to have the environmental privacy
necessary for pursuing a path of education. The laws do not protect the privacy
provided by the physical presence of a school or education institution, or the
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580-22582 (West 2019).
Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 113 WASH. L. REV. 1113 (2015).
314 Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671
(2016).
312
313
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privacy provided by an educational platform that allows for individualized
learning. Education privacy laws generally also do not protect the educational
privacy rights of educators or researchers, who also benefit from the privacy of
physical education spaces.
The use of education technologies in times of pandemic have exposed the
need for an updated right to educational privacy. The increased use of new
education technologies, the public-private hybrid nature of many education
technology platforms, and the unique vulnerabilities of the student population
give rise to the need for a new right to educational privacy, a right the law should
protect in addition to protections for children and existing protections for
student privacy in public institutions. Some, including Khalilah Barnes, have
even called for the creation of a Students’ Bill of Rights,315 protecting key rights
like privacy.
The heightened sensitivities of the pandemic era expose a number of gaps
in the legal protections for students. First, there should be more legal limitations
on private educational institutions collecting, using, and sharing student data.
FERPA protections do not apply to most collection of student data done by
private platforms. In addition to relevant privacy obligations under COPPA and
general privacy laws, educational institutions (public or private) should be held
to a higher standard. The law should recognize the school or the educational
institution as a specific place and context, with specific privacy expectations that
are different from other business contexts.
Additionally, the increased use of educational technologies has exposed the
necessity of addressing the disparate harms suffered by people from various
marginalized communities as a result of reliance on new technologies. New
privacy laws should take care to address the special needs of different students,
e.g., protecting against online harassment, which disproportionately affects
some groups. Students from marginalized populations may have special needs
when it comes to educational privacy, including the need to have private space—
digital or offline—when private space is at a premium at home.
Laws narrowly tailored to address the space necessary for educational
privacy should allow for innovation across education sectors, including privatesector educational platforms. The law should recognize the educational-privacy
interests that students have in protecting the privacy of their educational paths
and learning processes, to aid in independent exploration of ideas and personal
Valerie Strauss, Why a ‘Student Privacy Bill of Rights’ Is Desperately Needed, WASH. POST
(Mar. 6, 2014, 3:30 PM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2014/03/06/why-a-student-privacy-bill-of-rights-is-desperately-needed.
315
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and educational development.316 Protecting educational privacy as a distinct
right would acknowledge that students of all ages, in public and private
institutions, have a privacy interest linked specifically to the concept of
education as requiring intellectual freedom.
Furthermore, educational privacy should encompass privacy protection for
educators and researchers as well, as all are part of the larger knowledge
production system. To protect the institution of formalized education, we
should honor and protect the privacy necessary for students, educators, and
researchers to teach, learn, generate, and share knowledge.
D. Consumer-Connection Technologies
Remote-communication technologies have been used to a great extent in
employment and education settings in response to the changes in society caused
by the pandemic. However, technologies like Zoom, Google Hangouts, and
other remote-communication technologies have also been used to increased
effect by ordinary human beings outside of their roles as employees or
students.317 All of these technologies come with privacy and security issues.318 It
is important to discuss the impact the pandemic has had on society’s relationship
with privacy and technology, on an individual, human level.
1. Remote-Connection Technologies
As the pandemic has enforced social distancing conditions, humans have
turned to technologies to stay in touch and maintain social relationships. This
has included use of mobile phones and connected devices to communicate,
whether through text messaging, phone calls,319 video calls, and more. In early
April, Verizon reported an average of 800 million wireless calls a day during the
week, more than double the number of calls usually made on Mother’s Day
(often one of the busiest days of the year for phone calls).320 In the same time
316 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Neil M. Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008).
317 Taylor Lorenz et al., We Live in Zoom Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/style/zoom-parties-coronavirus-memes.html.
318 Allen St. John, It’s Not Just Zoom. Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, and Webex Have Privacy
Issues, Too., YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 30, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/not-justzoom-google-meet-180813488.html.
319 Cecilia Kang, The Humble Phone Call Has Made a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/technology/phone-calls-voice-virus.html; Return of the
Phone Call: Why Talking Beats Texting When You’re in Isolation, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2020, 11:05
AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2020/mar/17/return-of-the-phonecall-why-talking-beats-texting-when-youre-in-isolation.
320 Cecilia Kang, The Humble Phone Call Has Made a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/technology/phone-calls-voice-virus.html.
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period, internet traffic rose to twenty to twenty-five percent more than typical
for the time.321
Increased use of phones, home internet connections, mobile devices, and
Voice Over IP programs means an increase in risk exposure for consumers in
regards to the privacy risks associated with these technologies. For example, the
privacy risks associated with phone calls include potential for wiretapping as well
as upstream surveillance from telecom providers as well as governments, who
have many avenues of access to phone data.
The pandemic has also caused a shift in interpersonal privacy, the privacy
that exists within social relationships. Social distancing has meant that more
socialization has shifted to the online space, including gatherings of friends and
family. Additionally, remote technologies have been used for dating and
romantic relationships. In a time when many people have been encouraged to
stay at home, and to maintain physical distance from others when outside the
home, many have turned to online chat, SMS, voice, and video chat to engage
in romantic activities.322 The simple fact that more people are using these
technologies for these purposes creates greater risk for abuse—including legally
unprotected forms of sexual harassment,323 stalking, nonconsensual
pornography,324 sexual deep fakes,325 and more. It is also possible that individuals
less versed in the dangers of online platforms in romantic contexts may now be
using those platforms, leading to greater potential for harm.
Cecilia Kang, The Humble Phone Call Has Made a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/technology/phone-calls-voice-virus.html.
322 Olivia Carville & Nate Lanxon, How to Date Online in the Age of Covid-19, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-20/online-dating-in-apandemic-coronavirus-keeps-singles-apart; Vijai Nathan, Date Lab: Our First Virtual Date,
WASH. POST (May 7, 2020, 6:00 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/date-lab-our-first-virtualdate/2020/05/05/95f1aaca-7e5c-11ea-a3ee-13e1ae0a3571_story.html; Frances Perraudin &
Sarah Marsh Coronavirus Is Icebreaker for Online Daters—But Meeting Has to Wait, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 20, 2020, 1:40 PM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/20/coronavirus-icebreaker-online-datersmeeting-wait; Melissa Schorr, Blind Date: ‘She Looked Like She Had Gotten Dressed up for Our
Virtual Date,’ BOS. GLOBE (May 8, 2020, 8:18 AM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/05/08/magazine/blind-date-she-looked-like-she-hadgotten-dressed-up-our-virtual-date
323 Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0,, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012).
324 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Waldman, A. (2019); Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and
Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay Online Communities, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 987 (2019).
325 Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753 (2019); Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra
Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free Speech Delusions,, 78 MD. L. REV. 892
(2019).
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Danielle Citron has theorized a right to sexual privacy, the privacy
concerning not only sexual information and sexual activities, but also the privacy
necessary to create room for human intimacy and intimate relationships.326 It is
important to understand sexual privacy in light of remote technologies,
particularly in the midst of a pandemic that discourages in-person contact. Many
of these technologies lack legal protections for privacy aside from the minimal
U.S. sector-specific privacy protections. As Citron argues, current privacy laws
do not adequately protect sexual-privacy interests. Citron calls for legal reform
to protect sexual privacy, including potentially the creation of new legislation
dedicated specifically to sexual-privacy rights.327 The need for sexual-privacy
protections is even more clear, as the pandemic has accelerated the adoption of
new technologies in romantic contexts.
2. In-Person Consumer Surveillance
Corporations have also begun surveilling their consumers in physical spaces,
in an effort to limit virus transmission. For example, some movie theaters have
proposed privacy-invasive measures, including temperature scans and symptom
questionnaires at the door.328 In early May 2020, Disneyland Shanghai
announced that it would reopen with enforced social distancing,329 and Disney
CEO Bob Iger has said the company has considered implementing temperature
checks at the door.330 It is possible companies could use technologies, including
drone surveillance cameras, facial recognition, Bluetooth beacons, and more to
enforce measures such as social distancing, mask wearing, and contact tracing.
Thus, individuals may find themselves the subjects of both government
surveillance and corporate surveillance. While individuals have some recourse
against government intrusions on fundamental rights, it is not so much the case
with corporate surveillance. Thus, attention must be paid to corporations’ use
of consumer surveillance as response to the COVID-19 epidemic, as it is likely
these surveillance measures will not immediately disappear once the pandemic
Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870 (2019).
Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870 (2019).
328 Gene Maddaus, Texas Movie Theaters Reopen With Health, Temperature Checks, VARIETY
(May 1, 2020 2:00 PM PT), https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/texas-movie-theaters-reopencoronavirus-1234595569.
329 Sarah Whitten, Shanghai Disneyland Will Offer Disney a Blueprint for How to Reopen Its Other
Theme Parks, CNBC (May 6, 2020, 3:38 PM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/shanghai-disneyland-will-offer-a-blueprint-forreopening-other-parks.html.
330 Jill Goldsmith, Disneyland Could Start Temperature Checks When Parks Reopen, Bob Iger Says,
DEADLINE (Apr. 7, 2020, 4:06 PM), https://deadline.com/2020/04/disneyland-temperaturechecks-coronavirus-reopen-plans-1202903111.
326
327
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has ended.
3. Digital Inequities
Children and young people may have unique experiences with privacy and
technology in this public-health crisis. As schools have moved online and other
activities have shut down, minor students have likely been using computers and
mobile devices in an unsupervised capacity at higher rates than before. Children
and young adults have been creative in their use of Zoom outside of educational
uses—using Zoom for dating, parties, and other social engagements.331 Children
could be losing the safety that comes with having adult supervision by parents
or teachers in some of their use of these technologies.332 This raises greater
potential for abuse, including privacy harms like harassment, cyberstalking,
cyberbullying,333 child targeting, nonconsensual pornography,334 and other
privacy violations, including sexual-privacy violations.335
Privacy harms related to communication via online or remote platforms are
often worse for women and girls,336 LGBTQ people,337 people of minority status
(based on race, religion, or other), disabled people, and other individuals who
come from marginalized groups.338 Algorithmic harms are often worse for many
marginalized groups, as the effects of AI bias reflect the systemic biases in
society. The increased use of technology, including privacy-invasive technology
and AI-based systems, will likely have an unequal impact on privacy for different
groups.
The lack of free, accessible remote communication technologies has not
only disparately harmed the poor and people in rural communities, but it also
Taylor Lorenz et al., We Live in Zoom Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/style/zoom-parties-coronavirus-memes.html.
332 Press Release, Cox Commc’ns, New Research Reveals Risky Internet Behavior Among
Teens, but There Are Encouraging Signs of Improvement with Increased Involvement of
Parents and Guardians COX COMMC’NS (May 10, 2007),
http://www.cox.com/wcm/en/aboutus/datasheet/takecharge/archives/2007-riskybehavior.pdf.
333 Ari Ezra Waldman, Triggering Tinker: Student Speech in the Age of Cyberharassment, 71 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 427 (2017).
334 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, Criminalizing
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and
Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay Online Communities, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 987 (2019).
335 Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.LawJ. 1870 (2019).
336 Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2000); ANITA L.
ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988)
337 Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay Online
Communities, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 987 (2019).
338 Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051 (2018).
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disproportionally harms incarcerated people and their loved ones. Incarcerated
people already have few of the communication abilities people in the free world
enjoy. As prisons have locked down visits, some facilities have also limited the
ability for incarcerated people to access phones and computers (or in some
cases, any shared spaces).339 As remote videoconferencing technology explodes
in usage elsewhere, the same cannot be said for jails and prisons. Incarcerated
people already have few expectations of privacy, but here, better
videoconferencing technologies could help restore human dignity to
incarcerated people and their loved ones in the free world.
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Consumer Privacy
The law offers legal protections for communications privacy, including the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The increased use of landlines and
mobile telephone calls highlights the need for privacy protections over
telephone communications, in addition to the protections needed for online
communications.
However, the use of remote technologies highlights problems related to
technology platforms, including those used for communication in a time of
social distancing. One area of interest is intermediary liability, or the immunity
protections certain internet platforms receive regarding some areas of liability.
The increased use of remote working technologies that include photo, audio, or
video also create greater content moderation, speech regulation, and online
harassment concerns for tech platforms. In particular, the increasing importance
of technology platforms in this public health crisis raise issues of platform
governance, including issues of online harassment, speech, and liability (or
immunity from liability), aiding the greater trend of tech platforms becoming
what Kate Klonick has named “the new governors of speech.”340
In the United States, many internet intermediaries are protected by Section
230, a law that provides immunity for certain platforms against some types of
claims based on user-generated content on the platform.341 Section 230 has been
the subject of much debate among scholars, policymakers, and courts. Some
argue that Section 230 is “the law that created the Internet,”342 while others argue
Joseph Shapiro, As COVID-19 Spreads imn Prisons, Lockdowns Spark Fear Of More
Solitary Confinement, NPR (June 15, 2020 4:53 PM ET),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/15/877457603/as-covid-spreads-in-u-s-prisons-lockdownsspark-fear-of-more-solitary-confinemen.
340 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018).
341 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
342 JEFF KOSSOFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
339
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that the law allows for critical harms to privacy and civil liberties.343 Congress
amended Section 230 in 2018 with the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online
Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA),344 leaving an opening for further erosion
of Section 230 protection for platforms. While it remains to be seen how Section
230 protections will fare in the future, the myriad problems with technology
platform power have become a pain point for many policymakers, particularly
as momentum has built against the technology industry (referred to some as the
“techlash345”).
To regulate technology platforms, a privacy-forward approach must balance
two competing privacy interests: the interests of individuals to protect their data
from others; and the interests of individuals in being able to access a space that
allows them the privacy to develop their own identities and pursue their
intellectual and social interests.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Changing Privacy Norms
Our expectations of privacy (reasonable or not) are changing. The overall
rise of the digital economy is certainly part of this change, but the integral roles
of technology in this pandemic have also served to accelerate change in privacy
norms. While it may be tempting to say that some of these changes will be
limited to the time of pandemic, it is likely that changes in norms will have longer
effects over time.
1. Blurring the Line Between Cyber and Physical Space
The pandemic pushed life indoors and online. As work, school, and social
life all moved online, society has seen a further erosion in the division between
the digital and the physical. Some of the privacy losses suffered in this pandemic
have related to the loss of physical spaces. Students have lost the educational
privacy afforded to them by the physical space of schools and universities.
Employees have lost the privacy of their home, as remote employee surveillance
343

See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying
Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (2017); Carrie Goldberg,
NOBODY’S VICTIM: FIGHTING PSYCHOS, STALKERS, PERVS AND TROLLS (2019).
344 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. Law. No.
115-164, 132 Stat. 1253. SESTA
345 Rana Foroohar, Year in a Word: Techlash, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/76578fba-fca1-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e; Eve Smith, The
Techlash Against Amazon, Facebook and Google—And What They Can Do, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20,
2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlash-against-amazonfacebook-and-google-and-what-they-can-do.
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has blurred the boundaries of space. The pandemic has also caused a crisis in
interpersonal privacy, the privacy that exists within social relationships, as more
relationships either play out in a remote, connected fashion, or are disrupted by
the growing use of remote technologies in the home.
As society becomes increasingly digitized, with many essential functions of
society taking place in the digital realm or through digital intermediaries, the
distinction between digital and physical becomes increasingly meaningless. We
are living through contextual shifts in how society understands the borders and
limits of physical and digital spaces. Privacy law should attempt to protect cyber
space as much as it protects physical space and digital privacy as much as it does
physical privacy. This shift in norms has been slowly developing over time, and
the pandemic’s focus on remote socialization may have highlighted or quickened
this change.
2. Privacy Is Essential for Public Health
Both public and private actors have used the public health emergency as a
rationale for deployment of privacy-invasive technologies and technologicallyinfluenced programs. Individuals have been asked to accept more and more
privacy-violating technologies, in a number of spaces. At the same time, both
physical and digital privacy have been threatened, all for the sake of pandemic
response. However, there will always be another emergency. This is particularly
apparent, as many of the technologies used in pandemic response are not
entirely new technologies. What has changed is the shift in scale and the shift in
justification for violations of privacy.
Society must protect the health of its people. We must remain vigilant about
privacy incursions, because shifts in privacy norms now will lead to lasting
repercussions even after the emergency has ended. We must also design these
systems with purpose limitation for collection, use, and transfer of data, so that
a system that collects data for public health will not later be used to infringe
upon individual rights. Furthermore, for every technology and technologicallyinfluenced response to this pandemic, there has always been a maximally secure
and privacy-protecting version. Both state and private actors should consult with
technologists and advocates in creating and implementing programs for public
health response. Laws must be nimble enough to allow for flexibility, but with
exceptions narrowly tailored to prevent privacy overreach due to purpose
dilution.
Not only can privacy and public health co-exist, but privacy is essential for
public health. As seen with the failure in digital contact app adoption, individuals
will not willingly give their data to governments or companies if they cannot
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trust that their privacy rights will be respected. This is problematic because
pandemics and public health crises of all sorts require new technological
innovations and technologically influenced solutions. To protect public health,
we must protect privacy.
B. Law and Policy Recommendations
At time of writing, Congress is evaluating two competing bills dedicated to
privacy and COVID-19.346 Both bills address privacy protections for the data
collection and tracking measures used in public health response. There does not
appear to be enough political momentum to bring either bill to fruition, in an
election year.347 However, there is still time to use lessons from this pandemic
to solve privacy issues for the future.
1. Sectoral Privacy Protection Is Not Enough
The pandemic’s privacy impacts reach across areas of law, from consumer
protection regulation to government surveillance law, and across different
industries, from education to healthcare. It is difficult to grasp the full landscape
of privacy in pandemic, due to the ever-expanding web of laws and regulations
that touch upon privacy and technology. That difficulty, highlighted by the
pressing urgency of the pandemic, is in itself one of the lessons to be gleaned
from analyzing privacy and technology in this public health crisis. Regulating by
data type and data setting does not work without overarching principles and
cohesiveness between legal protections.
While limiting federal privacy regulation to specific laws for specific sectors
may have been adequate for the early days of the internet and connected
technologies, it is past time for Congress to pass a national privacy law that
would provide cohesive, coherent rules based on core privacy values, that could
then be translated to different sectors, industries, types of data, and types of data
actors. The difficulty of protecting privacy in coronavirus testing is only one
example of when the various sector-specific privacy laws fail to protect privacy
or associate harms for individuals. The rising use of remote communication
technologies in education is another such example, as even the strongest
amalgamation of FERPA, COPPA, and FTC consumer protection law would
not be enough to protect student or educational privacy. The sectoral privacy
regime creates confusion, and the difficulty of compliance with conflicting
346 COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020);
Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3759, 116th Cong. (2020).
347 David Uberti, Coronavirus Privacy Bills Hit Roadblocks in Congress, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(June 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-privacy-bills-hit-roadblocks-incongress-11592213400.
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requirements may hamper innovation and public health response. Differing
state regulations compound that confusion, with some state laws becoming de
facto regulations for the nation based on difficulty of compliance.348
A federal privacy law will be most useful in creating privacy values and
standards across sectors, while still allowing for sectoral privacy laws to fill in
the gaps. Technologies are constantly changing, as are uses of technologies, as
we have seen with medical AI, telehealth communication technologies, and
healthcare robots. Thus, it is more useful to create laws that allow for room for
innovation and growth of industries, as opposed to laws that are overly
restrictive, particularly in an omnibus regulation that seeks to govern many
industries. For example, instead of regulating particular technologies, like
healthcare robots, a federal privacy law could instead specifically regulate
collection and use of data, as well as physical privacy violations caused by
technologies with physical presence or embodiment.
2. Health, Biometric, and Genetic Privacy Laws Are Insufficient
The pandemic has highlighted the inadequacies of current laws in protecting
sensitive health information, including biometric information, genetic
information, and more. This is apparent if for no other reason than that the
public health response to this global pandemic has generated the collection and
processing of a vast quantity of data that could be considered health, biometric,
or genetic data.
Any federal privacy law that seeks to govern all sectors must include
protections for health information and other sensitive categories of information.
A federal privacy law could serve to fill in some of the gaps of HIPAA, GINA,
and other laws that govern health information. For example, a federal privacy
law could protect patients when their data is collected by an actor that is not a
HIPAA-covered entity or business associate (something that has occurred with
some of the COVID-19 testing and contact tracing). It would also be wise to
include some of the provisions from state health privacy laws, including
biometric information privacy laws.
In lieu of a comprehensive federal privacy law, the U.S. needs stronger
sectoral privacy laws that would govern health, biometric, and genetic privacy.
Until a federal privacy law comes to pass, attention should be paid to updating
existing laws to address the potential for violations of health privacy and genetic
privacy. We should expand GINA to include greater protections against genetic
For example, in managing compliance, organizations may set their standards to match
the strictest state laws, making those state laws the de facto laws of the nation. Additionally,
when creating new laws, policymakers often borrow from other states’ laws.
348
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discrimination, including protection against disparate harms as Ifeoma Ajunwa
has suggested, as well as protection against discrimination based on
characteristics or health information that might not be categorized as genetic
data. Additionally, we should expand GINA protections past the currently
limited sectors of employment and health insurance discrimination to include
fundamental rights such as education and housing. Furthermore, genetic privacy
rights, including rights to donate data without fear of law enforcement access,
should be expanded, either through a genetic privacy law or through provisions
in a larger health or biometric privacy law.
Our current health privacy regime is insufficient to protect the privacy of
what is perhaps the most sensitive data for any individual: biometric data, or
data relating to or emanating from the body. Biometric data is particularly
important to protect because such data is not only extremely identifiable but
also intrinsically linked to our sense of selves. There’s a fundamental difference
between a data breach of credit card numbers versus a breach of face photos.
We understand that difference intuitively, and individuals deserve stronger
privacy protections for their sensitive biometric information, including health
information and genetic information.
3. Privacy Law Must Address Digital Inequities
The pandemic has thrown into sharp relief the digital and economic
inequities of modern life. No privacy law will ever fully protect the privacy of
the people unless it takes into account inequities in privacy and technology. We
should address discrimination as an information privacy harm, particularly
related to algorithmic discrimination, which is based on information related to
individuals. A federal privacy law should include protections for particularly
vulnerable classes, as well as limitations on discriminatory uses of data (including
disparate impact). These protections should be explicitly built into federal
privacy law.
In lieu of a strong omnibus privacy law that includes protection against
discrimination and disparate harm, other legal changes can help serve similar
purpose. Laws that protect against harms that are often gendered or racialized
can be helpful, including specific laws targeting harms like online harassment,
cyberstalking, nonconsensual pornography, and swatting.349 Additionally, laws
that give more rights to data subjects, including algorithmic rights can help
empower individuals who may suffer disproportionately from the harms of
surveillance and algorithmic decision-making systems. One example is enforcing
transparency and accountability for algorithms used in sentencing.
For example, New York’s non-consensual pornography law and a similar bill still
stalled in Congress. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/nyregion/revenge-porn-law.html
349
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4. Privacy Law Should Protect a Right to Educational Privacy
By shifting education to the digital space, and to the private home, the
pandemic has exposed flaws in privacy protections for students and educators.
Privacy law protects children as vulnerable classes under COPPA and FERPA.
However, these protections are limited in types of data (student records for
FERPA) and categories of data subjects and data controllers. We should reform
education privacy laws to include protections ordinarily afforded to the physical
educational space. Protection of educational privacy should transcend
protection of children as a vulnerable class or school records as a sensitive form
of data and should include instructors, researchers, and others engaged in the
intellectual enterprise of education. Educational privacy protections should also
be applicable to both public and private entities. This is but one failure in the
current sectoral privacy regime, and one example of how the shifting privacy
norms of cyber and physical space should change the way privacy law regulates.
5. Privacy-Forward Platform Regulation
The question of how to regulate technology platforms has risen to the
forefront in recent years, and both policymakers and the general public have
pressed for reform in a number of ways. The pandemic has exposed once again
the integral role of technology companies and intermediaries in society, as
technologies like remote videoconferencing apps and digital contact tracing apps
have become important in COVID-19 response.
There are of course more problems with platform regulation than privacy.
Internet intermediaries provide venues for speech to occur, and potential issues
that must be raised for platform regulation include online speech access and
expression, online harassment, election interference, disinformation, and more.
Additionally, perhaps the greatest challenge in platform regulation today is not
privacy or online speech but rather the power imbalance between increasingly
powerful technology companies and people and governments. Some of this
power imbalance is due to the vast quantity of data many of the large technology
companies are able to collect, which has privacy implications but is not
necessarily a privacy-exclusive issue.
Platform regulation must protect the privacy of individual consumers, as
many have advocated for in calls to reform. However, the pandemic has also
highlighted the gradual social shift of society in increasingly considering digital
spaces as substitutions or supplements to physical spaces. Thus, it is crucial that
intermediary regulation not overly restrict intermediaries such that they would
no longer be able to provide the privacy of digital spaces that are necessary for
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identity development, intellectual exploration, freedom of speech, and more. We
must support privacy-forward platform regulation, separating the regulation of
technology companies as economic actors and the regulation of intermediaries
as venues for speech and connection.
6. Regulating Data Aggregators and Downstream Data Harms
The complex data cycles related to COVID-19 testing and contact tracing
show the difficulty of regulating based on initial point of collection. Laws do not
sufficiently protect against downstream harms, partly because it is difficult on a
technical basis for anyone party involved in a data lifecycle to track all the
different places data may go and different parties who may have access to said
data.
It is time for regulation that addresses the compounded privacy harms of
data aggregation. Currently, there are only a few state laws that address data
brokers or data aggregators. A federal law that regulates data aggregators as an
industry has the potential of protecting against myriad hams. Regulations that
target data aggregators can include, but should not be limited to enforcing
transparency about data sources that aggregators purchase and collect, as well as
rights for individual data subjects to request access to data collected about them,
as well as rights to correct and delete said data, and rights to opt out entirely
from having their data be included as part of data sets used and sold by data
aggregators. U.S. law includes some of these rights for some types of data
aggregation, including laws allowing individuals to opt out of marketing mail,
for example, as well as laws for algorithmic transparency in financial credit
reporting.350
Many of the downstream data harms relate to the potential of data being
misused as part of machine learning and algorithmic decision-making. U.S. law
does not generally address rights related to algorithmic decision-making (with
some exceptions), but the law should regulate situations where algorithmic
decision-making can be used to make determinations that impact on
fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article takes the particularities of the pandemic as a lens through which
to gauge the progress of privacy protections across sectors, using the COVID19 pandemic as a historical reference point. What is interesting about technology
is not its novelty, but its salience. Similarly, what is interesting about studying
Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, Washington Law Review, Vol. 89 (2014).
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privacy in pandemic is not the novelty of the pandemic itself or the use of
technology during these times, but rather what emerge as salient reflections on
privacy, technology, and public health in society today.
The global COVID-19 pandemic has changed society in myriad ways, and
it will take the long lens of history to understand the ramifications of this societal
crisis. What is certain is that developments during this time, whether or not they
relate to privacy and technology, will influence future directions for society. The
data-driven programs developed as COVID-19 response, from viral testing to
consumer communication technologies, have already transformed the way
society interacts with technology and concepts of privacy. Our privacy norms
are changing, and it is all but inevitable that the pandemic’s effects will be longlasting, with unforetold implications for our future society and its relationship
with technology. As we progress toward that future, it is imperative that we
create conceptions of privacy that are beneficial for society, as well as laws and
regulations that protect both public health and civil liberties.
This Article provides a contemporary account of privacy, technology, and
public health at this critical point in time. These situations will change as the
pandemic progresses, comes to an end, and eventually, diminishes from the
public sphere and public memory. As Teju Cole writes, in an essay on the
difficulty of analyzing an in-progress pandemic, “History’s first draft is almost
always wrong—but we still have to try and write it.”351
***
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